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The Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making
Christina M. Sautter*
2015 and 2016 mark the 30th anniversaries of the Delaware Supreme Court's
landmark decisions in Unocal and Revlon, respectively. Those cases and their progeny
called for enhanced scrutiny standards to be applied in change of control transactions as
well as to deal protection devices-contractual provisions which deter third parties from
overbidding between signing and closing. Since those decisions, the courts have struggled
with the application of these enhanced scrutiny standards. This Article uses auction theory
principles and the related concept of information costs to correlate deal protection devices
to the pre-signing sale process in change of control transactions. More specifically, this
Article argues that the more extensive the pre-signing sale process, the more information
that both the selling company, or target, and buyer have gathered. Specifically, the target
board (who has a duty to maximize stockholder value in change of control transactions)
achieves greater certainty regarding maximum value from engaging in a more extensive
pre-signing sale process. Similarly, the buyer has greater certainty regarding the target's
value. At the same time, information costs incurred on both sides is higher-as the parties
expend more to learn about the value of the company, there is a lower likelihood that a
third party will overbid In this case, the courts should be more tolerant of more restrictive
deal protection devices because of this information certainty.
Conversely, when the target has engaged in only a single bidder negotiation,
information costs are lower as is certainty that maximum shareholder value has been
achieved. In that case, because of this lack of certainty regarding the achievable maximum
value of the target, the courts should be less tolerant of restrictive deal protection devices.
In other words there should be a direct proportional relationship between the information
gathering process (i.e., the pre-signing sale process) and the resulting deal protection
devices. This proportion-the Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making-is supported by
auction theory principles as well as Delaware Court of Chancery rhetoric. Despite,
however, rhetoric that more extensive sale processes should lead to more restrictive deal
protection devices, the Court of Chancery has not differentiated deal protection devices
contained in single bidder transactions from those in deals resulting from a more extensive
pre-signing sale process. The Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making seeks to provide a
template from which the courts can engage in a more nuanced analysis. If applied, in
reviewing deal protection devices, the courts would be making distinctions based off of the
pre-signing sale process rather than what they deem standard terms.
* Cynthia Felder Fayard Professor of Law & Byron R. Kantrow Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
Paul M. Hebert Law Center. Thank you to Michael Coenen, Bill Corbett, Joan MacLeod Heminway, Cheney
Joseph, Alain Levasseur, Ed Richards, Meghan Shaner, Anne Tucker, and Eric Wilder and to participants at the
2015 Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the 2014 Law and Society Conference, and the LSU Law
Center Faculty Workshop for their comments on earlier drafts. A special thank you to my research assistants, A.J.
Million and Martha Thibaut, without whom this Article could not have been written. This Article is dedicated to
my colleague, mentor, and friend, Cheney C. Joseph, Jr. (1942-2015).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Measure what is measurable, and make measurable what is not so.
-Galileo Galilei (1564-1642)1
For centuries, mathematicians like Galileo, architects, builders, biologists, musicians,
and artists, among others, have examined and applied the Golden Ratio in their work. 2 The
Golden Ratio is a mathematical proportion said to "describe a harmonious relationship
between different parts." 3 Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions involving sales of
corporate control can also be boiled down to a Golden Ratio-like equation. More
specifically, the contract terms used in a sale of control should bear a harmonious
relationship to the process leading up to the sale. Balancing contract terms with the sale
process helps to make measurable what is not generally easy to measure.
Striking this balance is a question of information flow. The flow of information drives
price but information itself is not free. The selling company-commonly known as a target
company, or target-incurs costs, both tangible and intangible, in finding a buyer,
including running a sale process, in valuing the company, and in negotiating the definitive
acquisition agreement.4 At the same time, bidders incur costs of their own by participating
in the sale process, engaging in due diligence on the target, and ultimately negotiating an
agreement. Because of the information costs incurred on both sides of a transaction, both
the target company and bidders must determine how much in the way of information costs
they are willing to incur before the resulting deal is no longer worth their while. This Article
concentrates on the target's information costs, including how the target gathers information
and how the target's information gathering should impact the ultimate deal terms.
In the bedrock case of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,5 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that, in a sale of corporate control, the target's board of
directors has a duty to maximize stockholder value. 6 The courts also have held that various
sale methods may be used in satisfying this obligation. 7 One available sale method is a full-
1. Hermann Weyl, Mathematics and the Laws of Nature, in THE ARMCHAIR SCIENCE READER 301 (Isabel
S. Gordon & Sophie Sorkin eds., 1959).
2. See MARIO LIvIO, THE GOLDEN RATIO: THE STORY OF PHI, THE WORLD'S MOST ASTONISHING
NUMBER 6 (2002) (describing different individuals who have studied the Golden Ratio). The Golden Ratio is also
known as phi, the Golden Number, the Golden Section, and the Divine Proportion. Id. at 2-3, 6.
3. Id. at 3. In mathematical terms, the Golden Ratio is defined as, "a special number found by dividing a
line into two parts so that the longer part divided by the smaller part is also equal to the whole length divided by
the longer part." Elaine J. Hom, What is the Golden Ratio?, LIVESCIENCE (June 24, 2013, 7:02 PM), http://www.
livescience.com/37704-phi-golden-ratio.html. This number is irrational and is often rounded off to 1.618. Id
4. For a more detailed discussion of these information costs, see Section III.A.
5. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (explaining that auctions do
not need to precede every change of control transaction).
2016]
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blown auction8 process; however, that would typically be the most costly option.9 Due to
the competitive nature of the auction it would likely provide the target with the most
security that the price being paid correlates to maximum stockholder value. 10 Another sale
method is single bidder negotiations. This method is typically cheaper than a full-blown
auction process but, in many cases, it provides the target with less security that the price
being paid maximizes stockholder value.I 1 Between these two alternatives lies the market
canvass. During a market canvass, the target will contact a select group of potential buyers
to gauge their interest in the target. 12 For many targets, the market canvass provides a good
middle ground, which allows the target to minimize its information costs while at the same
time providing the target with a sense of the value it can ultimately obtain.
In evaluating the target's fiduciary duties, one must not lose sight of the potential
buyer's perspective. Potential buyers may not be eager to incur the costs necessary to
participate in a competitive auction process when there is a chance they may not win the
auction. Moreover, the ultimate auction winner will typically seek security that the deal is
not going to be disrupted by a third party. This security comes in the form of deal protection
devices-contractual provisions in negotiated M&A agreements intended to deter third
party bidders between the signing and closing of a transaction. A continuing issue for M&A
practitioners is how restrictive these deal protection devices can be. The Delaware Supreme
Court has held that deal protection devices are subject to the enhanced security standard
first announced in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 13 and that such provisions cannot
make a transaction a "fait accompli."' 14
This Article contends that the relationship between the deal protection devices and
sale process is derived from information flow and information costs. In a nutshell, the more
extensive the pre-signing sale process, the more information costs the respective parties are
made to bear. Consequently, a more accurate assessment of the target's value is achieved.
When this is the case, the deal protection devices can be more restrictive. Conversely,
single bidder negotiations can become a gamble in that each party has less information and
subsequently lowered costs. On the downside, these information cost savings may not "pin
the tail on the donkey" regarding the maximization of shareholder value. Accordingly, the
deal protection devices should be less restrictive so as not to overly dissuade third parties
from bidding. In other words, the sale process and the deal protection devices should bear
a proportional relationship. This proportion is what I dub the "Golden Ratio of Corporate
8. As used in this Article, the term "auction" refers to a structured competitive bidding process. For a
detailed description of an auction process, see Christina M. Sautter, Auction Theory and Standstills: Dealing with
Friends and Foes in a Sale of Corporate Control, 64 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REv. 521, 539-44 (2013)
[hereinafter Sautter, Auction Theory].
9. See generally Audra L. Boone & J. Harrold Muiherin, Is There One Best Way to Sell a Company?
Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28 (2009) [hereinafter Boone &
Mulherin, Auctions Versus Negotiations] (explaining why auctions are accompanied by high information costs).
10. See infra Section lI.A (discussing the economic incentives of auction theory).
11. Id.
12. For a more detailed discussion of market canvasses, see Sautter, Auction Theory, supra note 8, at 544-
45 and Christina M. Sautter, Shopping During Extended Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops-The
Development, Effectiveness, and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control Transactions, 73
BROOK. L. REv. 525, 540-41 (2008) [hereinafter Sautter, Shopping During Extended Store Hours].
13. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
14. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930-31 (Del. 2003).
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Deal-Making."
The Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making is consistent with auction theory
principles that tend to favor competition as a way of extracting the most value for the
target. 15 Moreover, the Delaware courts themselves have implicitly recognized this ratio
as the ideal. 16 Despite this implicit recognition, however, the courts, in many cases, have
failed to abide by the ratio by authorizing the same level of deal protection devices in a
single bidder transaction as have occurred in a transaction resulting from a full auction. 
17
This is problematic, as it has led to the erosion of the Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard
for deal protection devices. 18
A few caveats regarding the scope of this Article are in order at this point. First, this
Article assumes the applicability of Revlon and does not address the ongoing debate
regarding which transactions trigger Revlon's value maximization requirement. 19 Second,
this Article assumes the application of the Unocal standard of review to deal protection
devices and does not address the propriety of applying the Unocal enhanced standard to
such devices. 20 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Article does not advocate that
a competitive auction process must (or should) precede every sale of control or that a
certain set number of bidders must be invited to participate in any given sale process. This
Article does, however, advocate that a more extensive sale process is the easiest way for a
target board to gather information regarding value maximization. The extensiveness of the
pre-signing sale process is context specific and will vary depending on a number of factors
such as the unique characteristics of the company and the industry in which the company
operates.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes the ideal M&A sale process as
defined in the Delaware Supreme Court's landmark decisions of Unocal and Revlon. Part
III describes why an extensive pre-signing sale process is a target's best means of gathering
information. In particular, this Part details the role of auction theory and information costs
in establishing the ideal M&A sale process. Part IV describes the Delaware Court of
Chancery's current practice regarding deal protection devices using two cases as an
15. For a description of auction theory principles, see infra Section III.A.
16. Infra Part III.B.
17. Infra Part IV.
18. For more information on the erosion of the enhanced scrutiny standard, see generally Steven M.
Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681 (2013).
19. A number of commentators have recently addressed when Revlon is and should be triggered and even
whether the Revlon doctrine should be abolished. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of
Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277 (2013) (arguing that in determining the applicability of Revlon, the
Delaware courts should eschew the consideration-based approach in favor of a conflicts of interests-based
approach which focuses on ultimate control of the surviving entity); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Removing Revlon, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485 (2013) (arguing for the abolishment of the Revlon doctrine); Lyman Johnson &
Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167 (2014) (arguing that the Revlon doctrine
has been limited by subsequent corporate law developments and that Revlon's focus on short-term value
maximization should be rejected); Mohsen Monash, Defined by Dictum: The Geography ofRevlon-Land in Cash
and Mixed Consideration Transactions, 59 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing the Delaware Court of Chancery's
use of dictum to describe the parameters of Revlon-land).
20. For an extensive discussion and analysis regarding the suitability of applying the Unocal enhanced
standard to deal protection devices, see generally Jay B. Kesten, Adjudicating Corporate Auctions, 32 YALE J.
ON REG. 45 (2015) (arguing that the Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard should not be applied to deal protection
devices).
2016]
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illustration. Part V describes the Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-making and the
implications of the Ratio. Dealmakers would have a measurable standard according to
which they could negotiate deal protection devices and plaintiffs challenging M&A
transactions would have a measurable standard against which they could contest the
validity of these devices.
II. THE IDEAL M&A SALE PROCESS
In 1985 and 1986, the Delaware Supreme Court issued two landmark decisions,
Unocal and Revlon, in the context of hostile takeovers, which the courts have since applied
to negotiated transactions. Together these cases set the foundation for the ideal M&A sale
process as well as the proper standard of review for deal protection devices. Moreover,
these cases provide examples of the subjective factors often at play in any given
transaction. As both cases reveal, board members may have conflicts of interest that
become evident in a sale of corporate control. Because of this possibility, the Supreme
Court attempted to craft standards, which help to root out these inherent conflicts and to
restore trust in the board's actions.
A. Unocal: Announcing a Standard of Review for Defensive Measures
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court established an enhanced-scrutiny standard
applicable to board action taken in response to hostile takeover activity. 2 1 The underlying
purpose of this standard is to provide an objective determination that-through the
gathering of adequate information-the board has overcome the inherent conflict of
interest it faces when addressing a threat to the corporation's existence. 22
The Unocal enhanced-scrutiny test requires a two-step analysis of a board's decision
to employ takeover defenses or deal protection devices.23 First, the board must prove that
it had "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed."'24 To satisfy this first step, the board must show a good faith and reasonable
investigation, which is materially enhanced by the approval of a board comprised of a
majority of outside independent directors. 2 5 Under the second step of the Unocal
enhanced-scrutiny standard, the defensive devices utilized must be reasonable in relation
to the threat posed.2 6 In this step, the court first determines whether the defensive measures
are "preclusive" or "coercive." 2 7 If the court is satisfied that the defensive measures are
neither coercive nor preclusive, the court then examines the "range of reasonableness" of
the board's decision. 28
Although the Delaware Supreme Court developed the Unocal enhanced scrutiny
standard in the hostile takeover context, the court later explicitly extended the standard to
21. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
22. Id. at 954-55.
23. Id. at 955.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
27. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 932 (Del. 2003).
28. Id. at 935 (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995)).
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deal protection devices in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.29 The court analogized
deal protection devices to defensive measures taken in the hostile takeover context. 30 Due
to this extension of the enhanced-scrutiny standard to deal protection devices, the facts of
Unocal itself are instructive as to the proper ratio of sale process (i.e., information
gathering) to deal protection devices.
In Unocal, Mesa Petroleum, led by the notorious "greenmailer," T. Boone Pickens,
made a hostile tender offer for Unocal. 3 1 Mesa's offer was a "textbook example of a
coercive tender offer."32 The proposed tender offer would use cash to acquire enough
shares to give Mesa a controlling interest in Unocal. 33 After acquiring a controlling
interest, the tender offer called for a merger that would give junk bonds to the remaining
Unocal shareholders in exchange for their stock.34
In response, the Unocal board convened multiple times to discuss the Mesa tender
offer and possible defensive measures. 35 Goldman Sachs advised the board that the Mesa
tender offer was "wholly inadequate." 36 Fearing that Unocal shareholders who did not find
Mesa's price attractive might nevertheless accept the offer for fear of being left in the
minority group and receiving only junk bonds, the board ultimately decided to oppose the
offer, and to implement defensive devices. 3 7 The board opted in favor of a self-tender by
Unocal for its own stock, but excluded Mesa so as not to inadvertently finance Mesa's
takeover of the company.38 The self-tender would cause Unocal to incur over $6 billion of
additional debt, which would make the company considerably less desirable to Mesa or
any other bidders.39
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the self-tender offer as valid under the new
enhanced-scrutiny standard.40 The Unocal board had reasonable grounds to believe a threat
to corporate policy existed because the Mesa offer was "a grossly inadequate two-tier
coercive tender offer coupled with the threat of greenmail. ' '4 1 The court gave significant
credit to the fact that Unocal's board was composed of a majority of outside independent
directors who acted in good faith and made a reasonable investigation. 42 Thus, the court
easily determined that the first step of the enhanced-scrutiny standard had been satisfied.43
The Unocal board also satisfied the second step of the enhanced-scrutiny standard
29 See id at 930-32 (holding that deal protection devices appearing in non-change of control transactions
are subject to enhanced scrutiny).
30. Id. at 932.
31. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. "The term 'greenmail' refers to the practice of buying out a takeover bidder's
stock at a premium that is not available to other shareholders in order to prevent the takeover." Id. at 956 n. 13.
32. Gevurtz, supra note 19, at 1498.
33. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950.
34. Id. at 949-50.
35. Id. at 950-53.
36. Id. at 950. Mesa's tender offer would give stockholders $54 per share, while Goldman Sachs determined
that Unocal's shares were valued "in excess of $60" per share. Id.
37. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950; Gevurtz, supra note 19, at 1498.
38. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951.
39. Id. at 950.
40. Id. at 956-57.
41. Id. at 956.
42. Id. at 955.
43. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
2016]
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when it adopted the self-tender offer that excluded Mesa. 44 The board's stated objective
was to defeat the Mesa offer, or if the Mesa offer succeeded, to provide the back-end of
Unocal's stockholders with greater value for their shares than would be provided by Mesa's
offer.45 These efforts would have been defeated if Mesa were able to benefit from the
exchange offer.46 Thus, the Unocal board's decision to implement a selective exchange
offer was reasonable in relation to the threat posed by Mesa's bid.
47
Thirty years after the Delaware Supreme Court rendered Unocal, it continues to play
a crucial role in M&A transactions. As previously mentioned, the court explicitly extended
the enhanced scrutiny standard to deal protections appearing in negotiated transactions. As
such, practitioners negotiate deal protection devices with the Unocal enhanced scrutiny
standard as a backdrop. In addition to the Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard, practitioners
also negotiate many M&A transactions in light of another thirty-year-old decision, Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 48
B. Revlon and the Maximization of Value in a Sale of Control
Shortly after the Delaware Supreme Court issued its decision in Unocal, it issued its
seminal decision in Revlon. 49 In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the
standard for assessing the conduct of a board of directors in selling a company. The court
held once the breakup of a corporate entity becomes inevitable, the sole duty of the board
of directors becomes the "maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
stockholders' benefit."' 50 The facts of Revlon are illustrative in calibrating the appropriate
ratio of deal protection devices to the sale process.
Revlon involved a hostile transaction during which Pantry Pride, Inc. and leveraged
buyout specialist, Forstmann Little & Co., submitted competing offers. 5 1 Initially, Pantry
Pride attempted to acquire Revlon through negotiations. 52 After Revlon rejected the offers,
Pantry Pride informed Revlon of its plans to acquire Revlon for $42-43 per share, or
commence a hostile tender offer at $45 per share. 53 Faced with a "grossly inadequate" price
for the company, the Revlon board implemented defensive measures. 54 The Revlon board
authorized a poison pill and for the company to repurchase ten million shares of the
company's common stock in exchange for promissory notes and preferred stock.
55
Pantry Pride then increased its offer to $50 and then later to $53 per share. 56
44. Id. at 956-57.
45. Id. at 956.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
49. The Delaware Supreme Court issued its written decision in Unocal on June 10, 1985. Unocal, 493 A.2d
at 946. The Delaware Supreme Court issued its oral decision in Revlon on November 1, 1985, but did not publish
its written decision in the case until March 13, 1986. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173.
50. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
51. Id. at 175.
52. Id. at 176.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 176-77.
55. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. The notes contained covenants that limited Revlon's operational flexibility
unless the independent members of the board approved certain business decisions. Id.
56. Id.
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Importantly, however, Pantry Pride's offer was contingent on the waiver of certain
covenants in the notes that shareholders had purchased. 57 Revlon's board responded by
authorizing management to negotiate a merger or leveraged buyout with alternate parties.58
Revlon's negotiations with alternate buyers culminated in an agreement with Forstmann
for $56 per share. 59 The deal with Forstmann included a number of deal protection devices
including a crown jewel lock-up, termination fee, and a no-shop provision.60 Most
importantly, Forstmann was willing to issue new debt to Revlon noteholders in order to
support the par value of the notes, which had been trading well below par value. 6 1
Meanwhile, Pantry Pride again raised its bid to $56.26 per share, and indicated that it would
engage in fractional bidding and top any Forstmann offer.6 2 Forstmann then raised its bid
to $57.25, which the Delaware Supreme Court described as "very little actual
improvement" over Pantry Pride's offer.6 3 Revlon's board agreed to the Forstmann deal,
motivated in part because of the board's fear of personal liability from litigation threatened
by the noteholders.
64
The Delaware Supreme Court struck down the crown jewel lock-up and the no-shop
provision as a breach of the Revlon board's fiduciary duties.65 The court found the lock-
up had a "destructive effect on the auction process." 66 Rather than using the lock-up to
enhance the ongoing bidding process between Pantry Pride and Forstmann, Revlon's board
used the lock-up as a way of favoring one bidder in order to protect the board members
from personal liability. 67 The court stated the no-shop provision was "impermissible under
the Unocal standards when a board's primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer
responsible for selling the company to the highest bidder." 68 Pantry Pride and Forstmann
had made relatively similar offers, neither of which posed a threat to shareholder
interests. 69 Rather than using the no-shop agreement to obtain an advantage for
shareholders, the board had agreed to negotiate with Forstmann in order to favor its own
interests. 70 By agreeing to negotiate only with Forstmann, the Revlon board effectively
ended rather than intensified the bidding contest. 71
57. Id. at 178.
58. Id.
59. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176-77.
60. Id. at 178.
61. Id. at 178-79.
62. Id. at 178.
63. Id. at 184.
64. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178-79, 183-84. The note contained a typical covenant, which, inter alia, prevented
Revlon from selling the company unless the independent board members approved. Id. at 177. The note covenants
"stymied" Pantry Pride's takeover attempts. Id. However, the board waived the note covenant with respect to the
Forstmann transaction. Id. at 178. When the waiver was announced, the notes' trading price dropped below par,
causing the noteholders to become angry and to threaten litigation. Id. In negotiating the transaction with
Forstmann, Revlon made the noteholders a priority and Forstmann agreed to support the par value of the notes if
Revlon entered into an agreement with Forstmann. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
65. Id. at 184.
66. Id. at 183.
67. Id. at 184.
68. Id.
69. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
70. Id.
71. Id.
2016]
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Although Revlon involved a hostile takeover, the courts very quickly extended Revlon
to negotiated transactions. 72 Hence, in a negotiated sale of control, the target board has an
obligation to ensure the maximization of stockholder value. Although the "auctioneering"
language in Revlon seemingly required that an auction precede any sale of control, the
Delaware courts backed away from the "auctioneering" term not long after Revlon.73 The
courts hurriedly pointed out that not every sale of corporate control must be preceded by
an auction. For example, four years after Revlon, in Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., the
Delaware Supreme Court specified that Revlon did not necessitate that a sale of control "be
preceded by a heated bidding contest."'74 Moreover, the Barkan court famously stated that
"no single blueprint" exists for how a target board ensures the maximization of stockholder
value.7 5
III. THE EXTENSIVE PRE-SIGN1NG SALE PROCESS AND WHY IT MATTERS
Despite the Delaware courts' repeated pronouncement that there is "no single
blueprint" for how a board satisfies its Revlon duties, the extensiveness of the pre-signing
sale process is important as it serves as a method for information gathering. Information
and the costs of obtaining information are driving economic incentives in M&A
transactions. This Part describes the importance of information costs in designing a sale
process using auction theory. It then provides examples of Delaware Court of Chancery
decisions recognizing the importance of the pre-signing sale process both as an information
gathering mechanism and a basis for more restrictive deal protection devices.
A. Economic Incentives-Information Costs and Auction Theory
Auction theory is an applied branch of economics and game theory used to analyze
and design optimal sale processes. 76 In an auction setting, sellers (or targets) and buyers
have conflicting goals. 77 On the one hand, sellers (or targets) are "seek[ing] the highest
possible sale price" while on the other hand, buyers are looking for "the lowest purchase
price." 78 Financial economists have used auction theory to design sale processes in an
attempt to balance these diverse interests.
One popular research area for financial economists is the issue of whether auctions or
single bidder negotiations better optimize a target's sale price. 79 Two seemingly opposing
72. Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 519, 549 (2009).
73. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, 184. The Delaware Supreme Court had specifically stated that "[t]he directors'
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company" and that "a board's primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer responsible
for selling the company to the highest bidder." Id. (emphasis added). For a detailed description of the movement
away from the auctioneering language and the seeming obligation to conduct a pre-signing market auction, see
Sautter, Shopping During Extended Store Hours, supra note 12, at 542-53.
74. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
75. Id.
76. John Min, Applied Mechanism Design: Solving for the Optimal Collusive Mechanism at First-Price
Auctions 4 (2010), https://econ.duke.edu/uploads/assets/dje/2010/Final%202010%20PDFS/MinDJE.pdf.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Boone & Mulherin, Auctions Versus Negotiations, supra note 9, at 28 (comparing the benefits
of single bidder negotiations with auctions).
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camps have developed on this issue. Professors Audra Boone, J. Harold Mulherin, Jeremy
Bulow, and Paul Klemperer best exemplify members of these two camps. Boone and
Mulherin have taken the position that full-blown auctions may not always maximize value
while Bulow and Klemperer have taken the opposite view. 80 But, the division is not as
clear-cut as it may first appear. In fact, each side inherently relies upon information costs
and the role these costs play in any sale process.
The target's information costs take various forms, both tangible and intangible. For
example, tangible costs include items such as the assembly and dissemination of due
diligence materials and the hiring of legal and financial advisors.8 1 Costs will vary from
deal-to-deal and will depend on the size and type of the company, but those costs will likely
increase the more extensive the pre-signing sale process is. Along those lines, if the target
were to conduct a full-blown auction, financial and legal advisors would play a more
significant role in structuring the auction, inviting bidders, overseeing the bidding process,
and reviewing bids. With the expanded role of advisors, costs will increase. Like tangible
costs, a target's intangible costs can take various forms. Targets must consider the types of
information that potential buyers would want and need to make an accurate assessment of
the target's value and the potential effect of releasing such information. As Professor
Robert G. Hansen has explained, a potential issue (and possible cost) is that "the
information relevant to an accurate valuation may also be valuable to potential buyers in
their role as competitors, suppliers, or customers of the selling company." 82 Moreover, the
more potential buyers that the target contacts to field interest in participating in the process,
the greater the possibility that the sale process may be leaked. In addition, targets
sometimes shy away from more extensive sale processes, such as full-blown auctions, for
fear of losing employees, customers, or suppliers. 83 In addition, the possibility that the
auction will fail and that the target might then be considered "damaged goods" is another
possible intangible cost to be weighed.8 4
Like a target, bidders' participation in any given sale process is not without costs, both
tangible and intangible. Like a target, bidders typically hire legal and financial advisors to
assist them in the due diligence process and in making offers. 85 Another consideration for
bidders is that the more participants in any given sale process, the higher the likelihood that
a bidder may not come out "on top." Bidders and targets, alike, must consider this
intangible cost in weighing a sale process.
Boone and Mulherin recognize that "conventional wisdom and common sense suggest
that all sellers should implement a wide-ranging auction." 86 Their research, however, has
found that there is not a "measurable difference" in value obtained when comparing an
auction (including a pre-signing market canvass) and a single bidder negotiation. 87 Boone
80. Id. at 32.
81. See id. (discussing "explicit, out-of-pocket expenses borne by selling companies, such as bankers' and
lawyers' fees").
82. Robert G. Hansen, Auctions of Companies, 39 ECON. INQUIRY 30, 33 (2001).
83. Sautter, Shopping During Extended Store Hours, supra note 12, at 540.
84. Id.
85. See Boone & Mulherin, Auctions Versus Negotiations, supra note 9, at 33 (discussing bidders' costs in
"preparing their offers").
86. Id. at 28.
87. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, How are Firms Sold?, 62 J. FIN. 847, 865 (2007) [hereinafter
Boone & Mulherin, How are Firms Sold?].
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and Mulherin attribute this to "information costs between sellers and buyers [which] can
severely limit the apparent benefits of an auction" and that when a seller institutes
"constraints on the number and kinds of bidders and otherwise 'manage[s]' the selling
process to reduce information costs," sellers can achieve greater value.88
Boone and Mulherin explain that in some cases the possible information costs
incurred on both sides may cause sellers to limit the sale process, which in turn, may
"induce more aggressive bidding by those allowed to participate in the process." 89 The
theory behind this argument is a balancing of the bidders' "search and evaluation costs"
and the bidders' likelihood of winning the auction, which may be due in large part to the
numbers of bidders in the process. 90 Boone and Mulherin further state that:
when bidding companies are confident that their own offers will not be trumped
by that of "uninformed" and perhaps overly aggressive bidders, they are likely
to offer to pay higher prices-prices that more than offset the higher fees paid
the bankers and lawyers who help manage the selling process. And to the extent
this is so, for a given seller there may be an 'optimal' number of potential bidders,
neither too many nor too few.91
Although Boone and Mulherin's research may question whether a full-blown auction
is always the best route to maximizing stockholder value, their research and the foregoing
quote, in particular, suggest that single bidder negotiations may not be the favored route
either. Moreover, Boone and Mulherin's research demonstrates that a balance must be
struck in engaging the "right" number and type of bidders in the pre-signing sale process
and also utilizing certain deal protection devices to provide assurances. 92 In striking this
balance, bidding companies can be confident that "their own offers will not be trumped by
that of 'uninformed' and perhaps overly aggressive bidders." 9 3
The goal in any sale process is for bidders to bid their reservation prices. Boone and
Mulherin argue that bidders are incentivized to bid their reservation prices when targets
"invite[] more aggressive bidders to the next round of bidding and, in controlled sales, ...
limit[] the number of and kinds of bidders." 94 Professors Nihat Aktas, Eric de Bodt, and
Richard Roll argue that "[i]t is the pressure of potential rivals that matters."9 5 Along the
lines of limiting the kinds of bidders and possibility of potential aggressive bidders
existing, Boone and Mulherin recognize that "some bidders may have significant
synergies" which will provide those bidders with an informational advantage regarding the
target's value. 96 If these types of bidders are part of the sale process, other bidders may be
deterred from participating. 9 7 Moreover, Boone and Mulherin found that simply the
"presence of large bidders" deters other bidders. 98 In addition, they found that there was a
88. Boone & Mulherin, Auctions Versus Negotiations, supra note 9, at 28.
89. Id. at 32.
90. Id. at 33.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 28, 33.
93. Boone & Mulherin, Auctions Versus Negotiations, supra note 9, at 33.
94. Id. at 34.
95. Nihat Aktas et al., Negotiations Under the Threat of an Auction, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 241, 242 (2010).
96. Boone & Mulherin, Auctions Versus Negotiations, supra note 9, at 34.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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indirect correlation relating to the average bidder size and the number of bidders in the
process-the larger the bidders, the fewer the bidders. 99 Presumably the reason for this is
that smaller bidders are not able to successfully compete-or believe they are unable to
successfully compete-with larger bidders.
As previously mentioned, a significant concern in any sale process is information flow
and the costs involved in gathering information-the target's provision of information to
potential buyers and the target board's information with respect to the value of the target
and potential bidders' interest in the target. From a bidder's perspective, a bidder might be
more inclined to bid higher-to bid its reservation price-when the target has provided the
bidder with proprietary information. 100 The bidder will bid higher because it will be more
confident in the value of the target. 10 1 At the same time, the possibility exists that bidders
could evaluate the proprietary information negatively which could have a negative effect
on the ultimate bids. Moreover, targets are oftentimes concerned with losing a competitive
edge by providing proprietary information to bidders. 102
It is specifically this issue of information, or the lack thereof, which Professors Bulow
and Klemperer argue causes a more extensive sale process to be preferable for targets. They
argue "contrary to our usual instinct that auctions are profitable because they are efficient,
it is precisely the inefficiency of the auction-that entry into it is relatively ill-informed and
therefore leads to a more random outcome-that makes it more profitable for the
seller." 103 Also, from a practical standpoint, they point out that it is more effective to invite
bidders to the table as opposed to threatening to turn down an offer with no other bidders
present. 10 4 Bulow and Klemperer go on to explain that it is particularly beneficial for a
target to structure a sale process as an auction when it "has only limited information about
valuations, entry costs, or the number of bidders." 10 5 Like Professors Aktas, de Bodt, and
Roll, Bulow and Klemperer also focus on the power of competition. 10 6 Bulow and
Klemperer make clear that actual competition is more favorable than potential
competition. 107
So how does one reconcile these two seemingly opposing camps represented on the
one side by Boone and Mulherin and on the other by Bulow and Klemperer? First, one
must point out that, although Boone and Mulherin's research found that the values received
were not significantly different between the more extensive pre-signing sale process and
the single bidder negotiations, their research also found that a significant number of targets
choose to go the more extensive route. 10 8 More specifically, "[i]n a study of [400]
99. Id.
100. See id. (stating that "[r]evealing proprietary information can reduce uncertainty for some buyers, which
increases the price they are willing to pay").
101. Boone & Mulherin, Auctions Versus Negotiations, supra note 9, at 34.
102. See Hansen, supra note 82, at 32 ("Throughout the auction process, potential buyers may ask for
information that the selling company will view as too confidential to reveal.").
103. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?, 99 AM. ECON. REV.
1544, 1546 (2009) (emphasis added).
104. See id. at 1567 (noting that this efficiency is for the seller and not society).
105. Id. at 1568.
106. Compare Nihat Aktas et al., supra note 95, at 242, with Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 103, at 1568.
107. Id.
108. Boone & Mulherin, How are Firms Sold?, supra note 87, at 865, 869 (explaining that according to their
research there is not a "measurable difference" between the value received in auctions versus in single bidder
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transactions during the 1990s," Boone and Mulherin found that half of the targets were
sold in a process involving multiple bidders. 10 9 The multiple bidder sale process is a
popular way for a target board to become informed of the value of the target and of bidder
interest.
Moreover, at the heart of the matter, both camps stress the value of having
competitors, which will incentivize bidders to reveal their reservation prices. 110 This
possibility is clearly visible in surveys of dealmakers and in statements made by them. In
a 2006 poll, 80% of private equity firms stated that on the sell-side they would prefer to
use an auction while 90% of the same private equity firms stated they would prefer to avoid
an auction on the buy-side. "11 This sentiment is reflected by the late Bruce Wasserstein, a
well-known investment banker and businessperson, who said: "A wide-ranging auction
generally maximizes value, particularly since the 'best buyer' on paper is not always the
party who eventually pays the highest price.... [S]ophisticated bidders will do their best
to circumvent the auction format." 112
Wasserstein is not the only well-known businessperson to publicly state that bidders
avoid auctions. Warren Buffett is famous for repeatedly stating in each Berkshire
Hathaway Annual Report: "[w]e don't participate in auctions.'"113 This is precisely
because the price of the target company is unknown and Buffett does not want to get into
a bidding war for a company that has not set its own price. 114 Moreover, Buffett has stated,
"I don't fool a lot around with negotiations. If they name a price that makes sense to me, I
buy it. If they don't, I was happy the day before, so I will be happy the day after without
owning it." 115 If the Oracle of Omaha avoids auctions on the buy-side, auction theorists
must be right about their theory of competition in the sale of companies.
For dealmakers, another consideration playing an equally, if not more important role
as auction theory in the M&A sale process is Delaware jurisprudence. But auction theory
and Delaware jurisprudence are often "at odds." 116 As the next Parts describe, the
Delaware courts' preaching is that they have seemingly adopted the position of many
auction theorists that more extensive sale processes better maximize value and that deal
protection devices can aid in extracting maximum value. However, the Delaware courts'
practices are inconsistent with their preaching. 117
negotiations but in their study more than half of the targets chose a more extensive sale process).
109. Id. at 869.
110. See Boone & Mulherin, Auctions Versus Negotiations, supra note 9, at 34 (discussing inviting
aggressive competitors to the second round of an auction); Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 103, at 1568
(discussing the power of actual competition).
111. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 103, at 1544.
112. BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL: 2000 AND BEYOND 746-49 (WARNER BOOKS 2000).
113. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT (OMAHA, NEB.) 2, 25 (2014).
114. Id. Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway encourages principals of businesses interested in selling to contact
them but cautions that they are looking for six specific criteria, including "[a]n offering price." Id. Buffett
explains, "we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, when price is
unknown." Id.
115. Warren Buffett Quotes, THE BUFFETT, http://www.thebuffett.com/quotes/Investing-
Approach.html#.VNbRzVpP2DO (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
116. Kesten, supra note 20, at 47.
117. Infra Section HLI.B & Part V.
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B. The Delaware Courts'Rhetoric
Although the courts have clearly and repeatedly held that "no single blueprint" exists
for satisfying a board's Revlon duties, and as already described, the courts have upheld a
variety of sale processes, the courts also have repeatedly indicated that a more extensive
pre-signing sale process is preferable for information gathering. Moreover, the courts have
indicated that more restrictive deal protection devices may withstand enhanced scrutiny if
a more extensive sale process is utilized or if the device is being used to draw bidders into
the bidding process. This Section provides some examples of the courts' rhetoric regarding
the validity of more deal protection devices in light of an extensive sale process.
1. Favoring a More Extensive Sale Process for Information Gathering
Since the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Revlon, both the Supreme Court and
the Delaware Court of Chancery have indicated that a more extensive sale process is
favored over single bidder negotiations as a means of gathering information. Even the
Delaware Supreme Court in Barkan, which announced the "no single blueprint" standard,
indicated that if a board "is considering a single offer and has no reliable grounds upon
which to judge its adequacy, this concern for fairness demands a canvas of the market to
determine if higher bids may be elicited." 118 As previously mentioned, although the
Barkan court focused on the board's "body of reliable evidence" against which the board
would judge the fairness of a single offer and proceed without an "active survey of the
market," the court noted that "the circumstances in which [a] passive approach" would
suffice are limited. 119 Importantly, the court reiterated that "[a] decent respect for reality
forces one to admit that ... [sic] advice [of an investment banker] is frequently a pale
substitute for the dependable information that a canvas of the relevant market can
provide." 120
The Barkan rhetoric echoes a Court of Chancery decision decided six months earlier.
In In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litigation,12 1 the Court of Chancery stated "[t]he
value of the shares of a corporation is best determined by the marketplace. .".."122 This
statement implies that simply engaging in negotiations with one party is not optimal for
information gathering regarding value maximization. Moreover, more recently in 2011, in
In re Openlane, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,123 the Court of Chancery stated that "if a
board fails to employ any traditional value maximization tool, such as an auction, a broad
market check, or a go-shop provision, that board must possess an impeccable knowledge
of the company's business before the Court to determine that it acted reasonably." 12 4 Even
more recently, in 2013, in In re BioClinica, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, the Court of
Chancery indicated that auctions "ensur[e] the stockholders receive[] the highest price
available to them." 125
118. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d. 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989).
119. Id.
120. Id. (citations omitted).
121. In re Holly Farms Corp. S'holder Litig., 564 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1989).
122. Id. at 350.
123. In re Openlane, Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
124. Id. at *5.
125. In re BioClinica, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 8272VCG, 2013 WL 673736, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25,2013).
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Similarly, in 2007, then-Vice Chancellor, now Chief Justice, Strine in In re Netsmart,
Inc. Shareholders Litigation implied that smaller companies, particularly micro-cap
companies, may have an obligation to engage in a more extensive pre-signing sale process
rather than to just rely upon a passive post-signing market check. 1 2 6 Strine stated, "to test
the market for strategic buyers in a reliable fashion, one would expect a material effort at
salesmanship to occur. To conclude that sales efforts are always unnecessary or
meaningless would be almost un-American, given the sales-oriented nature of our
culture." 12 7 The Delaware courts' rhetoric does not stop with the sale process but also
extends to the restrictiveness of deal protection devices. As with the sale process, through
rhetoric, the Delaware courts seem to side with auction theorists who have argued that more
restrictive deal protection devices can be used to enhance the sale process and the ultimate
value received.
2. The Possible Restrictiveness of Deal Protection Devices
Deal protection devices are not considered on an individual basis, nor do the courts
consider them in a vacuum. The courts have continually examined deal protection devices
as part of the total package of deal protection and in light of the totality of the
circumstances, including the board's sale process. That being said, this Section summarizes
examples where the Delaware courts' rhetoric has indicated that a more restrictive
individual deal protection provision or total deal protection package may be valid following
a thorough sale process.
In Renaissance Communications Corp. v. NBC, Inc.,128 Vice Chancellor William
Allen summarized this viewpoint by stating:
I think it is different if the board negotiates highly particular protections in order
to get the highest price in the auction, because if the fiduciary duty always
overrides an auction, you have just made auctions less valuable, because people
obviously won't have the incentive to issue the best price. So it is self-defeating
for the fiduciary law to say in all events a higher and later price gives rise to a
fiduciary obligation to breach the contract. 
129
In reviewing a no-talk provision limiting a target board's ability to negotiate with and
provide information to a third party, then-Vice Chancellor Strine stated, in Ace Ltd. v.
Capital Re Corp.,130 that "one would think that there would be limited circumstances in
which a board could prudently place itself in the position of not being able to entertain and
126. In re Netsmart Technologies, Inc. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 177 (Del. Ch. 2007). In particular,
then-Vice Chancellor Strine stated:
Likewise, the board's rote assumption (encouraged by its advisors) that an implicit, post-signing
market check would stimulate a hostile bid by a strategic buyer for Netsmart-a micro-cap
company-in the same manner it has worked to attract topping bids in large-cap strategic deals
appears, for reasons I detail, to have little basis in an actual consideration of the M&A market
dynamics relevant to the situation Netsmart faced.
Id.
127. Id. at 197.
128. Renaissance Commc'ns Corp. v. NBC, Inc., No. 14446,1995 WL 1798510 (Del. Ch.. Aug. 1, 1995).
129. Id.at*15.
130. Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 107 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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consider a superior proposal to a transaction dependent on a stockholder vote." 131 He then
continued, "[o]ne legitimate circumstance may be where a board has actively canvassed
the market, negotiated with various bidders in a competitive environment, and believes that
the necessity to close a transaction requires that the sales contest end." 132
One area in which the Delaware courts have indicated that a thorough pre-signing sale
process may result in more restrictive deal protection devices is crown jewel lock-ups. In
Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court implied that crown jewel lock-ups may be upheld if
the role of the lock-up was to draw a bidder into the bidding process and "foster
bidding."' 133 A couple years later, in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 134 the court
reiterated that a valid use for crown jewel lock-ups is to attract bidders. 135 Like these
references regarding crown jewel lock-ups, some Delaware judges have made similar
references regarding standstill agreements and a board's promise not to waive a standstill.
For example, in reviewing a board's promise not to waive a standstill, then-Vice Chancellor
Strine strongly alluded that such a restrictive deal protection device may follow an
extensive pre-signing sale process:
Contemplate, for example, a final round auction involving three credible, but
now tired bidders, who emerged from a broad market canvass. One can easily
imagine how a board striving in good faith to extract the last dollar they could
for their stockholders might promise the three remaining bidders that the top
bidder at 8:00 p.m. on the next Friday will get very strong deal protections
including a promise from the target not to waive the Standstill as to the losers. 
136
Strine reiterated this sentiment in In re Ancestry.com Shareholder Litigation137 while
reviewing a "Don't Ask, Don't Waive" (DADW) Standstill. A DADW Standstill includes
not only a promise by the target company not to waive a standstill agreement but also a
promise by a bidder not to request a waiver of its covenant not to make an offer for the
target. Strine stated that DADW Standstills could be used for "value-maximizing
purposes." 13 8 But he cautioned:
the value-maximizing purpose has to be to allow the seller as a well-motivated
seller to use it as a gavel, to impress upon the people that it has brought into the
process the fact that the process is meaningful; that if you're creating an auction,
131. Id.
132. Id. at 107 n.36. Strine made clear, however, that "where a board has not explored the marketplace with
confidence and is negotiating a deal that requires stockholder approval and would result in a change in stockholder
ownership interests, a board's decision to preclude itself-and therefore the stockholders-from entertaining
other offers is less justifiable." Id. Strine has also recognized, however, that how the board goes about conducting
a pre-signing sale process-whether it be through a public auction or more targeted market canvas-is not an
issue that the Delaware courts typically entertain. See McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., No. 16963, 2000 WL
516265, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2000) ("Whether it is wiser for a disinterested board to take a public approach
to selling a company versus a more discreet approach relying upon targeted marketing by an investment bank is
the sort of business strategy question Delaware courts ordinarily do not answer.").
133. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986).
134. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
135. Id. at 1286.
136. In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 n.28 (Del. Ch. 2007).
137. In re Ancestry.corn S'holder Litig., No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).
138. Id. at 23.
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there is really an end to the auction for those who participate. And therefore, you
should bid your fullest because if you win, you have the confidence of knowing
you actually won that auction at least against the other people in the process. 1
3 9
Moreover, in evaluating the deal protection devices weighed against the sale process
conducted in Netsmart, Strine recognized that, "[t]he mere fact that a technique was used
in different market circumstances by another board and approved by the court does not
mean that it is reasonable in other circumstances that involve very different market
dynamics." 140 The foregoing are just a couple examples of indications the Delaware courts
have made in favor of more restrictive deal protection devices following more extensive
sale processes. Despite the Delaware courts' repeated acknowledgement that a more
thorough pre-signing sale process could, and maybe should, lead to more restrictive deal
protection devices, the courts tend to treat deals involving no pre-signing sale process or a
limited sale process the same as deals involving a more extensive pre-signing sale process.
IV. CURRENT COURT PRACTICE AND WHY IT IS NOT WORKING
As both the Delaware courts and auction theorists have alluded to, one of the most
significant information gathering methods for target companies is via the pre-signing sale
process. But, despite this recognition, in practice the Delaware courts do not appear to
differentiate transactions involving extensive sale processes from those with much less
extensive sale processes or the particular deal protection devices appearing in those
transactions.
Appendices A and B further elaborate upon this. The chart in Appendix A includes
all Delaware Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court cases decided between April
4, 2003 (the date of Omnicare) and December 31, 2014 published on Westlaw in which
the courts addressed the reasonability of deal protection devices. To find these cases, I did
a search using "deal protection" and "Revlon" to initially narrow down the cases within
that period. I then excluded cases if: (1) the case did not pertain to a challenge to deal
protection devices per se; 14 1 (2) the case involved the authorization of a settlement or
challenges to a settlement; 142 (3) the case involved a hostile takeover; 14 3 or 4) the case
involved a motion to expedite and did not address deal protection devices. 144 The 28 cases
139. Id.
140. In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 197 (Del. Ch. 2007).
141. See, e.g., C & J Energy Servs, Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.' and Sanitation Emps.' Ret. Tr., 107
A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014) (holding the Chancery Court's decision rested on an erroneous understanding of
Revlon and not addressing the deal protection devices); In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434
(Del. Ch. 2012) (focusing review on the target's "debatable negotiating and tactical choices" and not addressing
the deal protection devices); Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007) (addressing the
rescheduling of a stockholder vote). In In re Morton's Rest. Grp., Inc. S'holders Litig., the plaintiffs had initially
alleged that the deal protection devices were unreasonable but the court said the plaintiffs had waived that
argument by "not pressing the argument in their brief." In re Morton's Rest. Grp., Inc. S'holders Litig., 74 A.3d
656, 675 n.108 (Del. Ch. 2013).
142. See, e.g., In re Celera Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar.
23, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 59 A.3d 418, 437 (Del. 2012); In re Compellent Tech., Inc. S'holder Litig.,
No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 6382523, at * 1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9,2011).
143. See generally Air Prods. and Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011) (addressing
reasonableness of a target's defensive measures in the context of a hostile takeover).
144. Ehlen v. Conceptus, Inc., No. 8560-VCG, 2013 WL 2285577, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2013); Gaines
[Vol. 41:4
The Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making
set forth on the chart remained. Appendix A includes a brief summary of the pre-signing
sale process, namely whether the process was an auction, a market canvass, single bidder
negotiations, or some variation of those three. Appendix B includes more detail regarding
the sale process, including special knowledge of the board of directors.
A quick perusal of Appendix A shows that very similar deal protection devices are
found to be reasonable both in transactions involving more extensive sale processes and in
transactions with a limited sale process. In reviewing deal protection devices in transactions
arising from a more limited sale process, the courts oftentimes rely on cases involving a
more extensive sale process and uphold certain deal protection devices simply because they
are "market terms." 145 In Lock-Up Creep, Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon and I
alluded to this very issue and argued the end result of such action is that the "Chancery
Court has abandoned enhanced scrutiny analysis in favor of a reasonableness analysis." 146
The following Section includes an in-depth analysis of two such examples.
A. In re Plains Exploration & Production Co. Shareholder Litigation
In a 2013 decision, In re Plains Exploration & Production Co. Shareholder Litigation,
the Delaware Chancery Court addressed the fiduciary duties of a company's board of
directors in a sale of control transaction within the context of a single-bidder negotiation
strategy. 147 Plaintiff shareholders in Plains sought to enjoin the consummation of a cash-
stock merger wherein defendant Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. (Freeport) 14 8
would acquire defendant Plains Exploration & Production Co. (Plains). 149 After entering
into a confidentiality agreement with Freeport, the Plains board never looked into the
benefits of alternative transactions, nor did it solicit or search for potential buyers other
than Freeport itself. 150 In other words Plains' board engaged in a single-bidder strategy
from the beginning, never making contact with other prospective acquirers. As a result of
the merger, the CEO of Plains, James Flores, would become Vice Chairman and CEO of
the combined companies' oil and gas operations. 15 1
As the negotiations began to become more serious, Plains engaged its financial
v. Narachi, No. 6784-VCN, 2011 WL 4862978, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011); Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit
v. Bernal, No. 4663-CC, 2009 WL 1873144, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2009).
145. Davidoff& Sautter, supra note 18, at 708.
146. Id.
147. In re Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. S'holders Litig., No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124, at *1-2 (Del. Ch.
May 9, 2013). Of note is that a number of derivative suits brought by Freeport stockholders also derived from this
transaction. In April 2015, the Delaware Chancery Court approved a $153.75 million settlement of the
consolidated derivative suits. In re Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. Derivative Litig., Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement, Compromise and Release, No. 8145-VCN, 2015 WL 1565918, at * 1-2 (Del. Ch. Apr.
7,2015).
148. Originally, the leaders of Plains, Freeport, and McMoRan discussed a merger amongst the three
individual companies. Plains, 2013 WL 1909124, at * 1. Freeport and McMoRan merged prior to the acquisition
of Plains, and for simplicity this Article will address the latter transaction without regards to the first. Id.
149. Id. Although the shareholders originally were to receive a $50 per share value for their stock, the decline
in value of Freeport's stock following the announcement of the merger transaction resulted in a lower predicted
value for the plaintiffs. Id.
150. Id. at *2.
151. Plains, 2013 WL 1909124, at *1. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims that Flores was not fit to
negotiate on behalf of Plains given this arrangement by pointing to the large percentage of ownership in Plains
that Flores held, which the court found aligned his interests with the shareholders. Id. at *5.
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advisor, Barclays, to prepare a preliminary financial analysis of the transaction and the
amount at which Plains should attempt to sell its company in its entirety. 152 Barclays
responded that a price near $50 per share would suffice, and the Plains board was
eventually able to negotiate up from Freeport's initial $47 offer to that amount. 153
Although Barclays suggested using a collar to protect Plains' shareholders from any
negative fluctuation in Freeport's stock, the board did not pursue a provision to protect its
shareholders from market change despite the fact that it sought a stock-heavy deal.' 54
Plaintiffs contended that Flores' negotiations were "tepid at best.,,1 55
Plaintiffs contended that the Plains board breached its Revlon duties by failing to shop
the company either before or after entering into a deal with Freeport. 156 Plaintiffs argued
despite this feeble attempt to garner the maximum shareholder value for the company, the
Plains board agreed to "preclusive" deal protection provisions. 157 The Chancery Court
judge acknowledged that "[o]ne consequence of a single-buyer negotiation strategy is that
it requires a board to rely more extensively on its own knowledge and the knowledge of its
financial advisor in determining whether the proposed transaction is priced fairly.
Arguably, neither option provides a robust determination of market value." 1 58 Nonetheless,
the Delaware Chancery Court held the Plains board acted reasonably in engaging in a
single-bidder negotiation and thereafter agreeing to what the judge characterized as the
"mild deal protection devices" stipulated within the merger agreement. 159 The court found
Plains' board was justified in not pursuing alternative acquirers because it was focused on
either consummating a deal with Freeport or remaining a stand-alone company, either
option being an "attractive" end. 160 In light of the directors' expertise, the court opined, a
single-bidder strategy was sufficient to satisfy the board's Revlon duties if the deal
protection devices were not onerous and would not thereby "unduly impede a competing
bid.,, 16 1
The importance of Plains comes in the court's treatment of the deal protection devices
based on the pre-signing sale process (or the lack thereof). In regards to the deal protection
devices-specifically, a no-shop provision with fiduciary out, a three percent termination
fee, and matching rights-the court ruled that together they were not onerous. 162
"Collectively," it declared, "these deal protection devices would not have prevented either
a serious bidder from putting forth a higher bid or the [b]oard from entertaining and
accepting a bona fide superior proposal."' 163 Importantly, in reaching its conclusion the
court relied on case law wherein the Delaware courts had upheld similar provisions. But in
152. Id. at *2.
153. Id.
154. The board originally countered with $55 per share with two-thirds of the consideration in stock. Id.
155. Plains, 2013 WL 1909124, at *2 (internal quotations omitted).
156. Id. at*3.
157. Id.
158. See id. at *6 (citing Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989)) (stating that
"advice [of an investment banker] is frequently a pale substitute for the dependable information that a canvas of
the relevant market can provide") (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Id. at *4-6.
160. Plains, 2013 WL 1909124, at *6.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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those cases on which the court relied, the board of directors had not engaged in a single-
bidder strategy but instead had shopped the company prior to executing a merger
agreement. 164 For example, the court cited to In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation for the proposition that matching rights would not deter "a fervent bidder intent
on paying a materially higher price for the Company." 165 In that case, however, the board
of directors engaged in an extensive market check, signing confidentiality agreements with
29 bidders before agreeing to a deal with the bidder willing to pay the highest price. 166
Additionally, the court also cited In re 3Com Shareholders Litigation for the
proposition that a three percent termination fee was reasonable. 167 The published decision
is unclear as to whether the 3Com board conducted an extensive pre-transaction market
check or merely negotiated with one bidder throughout the process. 16 8 3Com's Proxy
Statement, however, makes clear that 3Com pursued negotiations with a single bidder. 169
But 3Com's sale process is irrelevant because the cases upon which the 3Com court relied
in concluding that a four percent termination fee and its other deal protection devices were
reasonable also all involved facts and circumstances wherein the relevant boards of
directors engaged in market canvasses or other multiple-bidder strategies. 170 First, the
3Com court also looked to Toys "R" Us to justify the reasonableness of its deal protection
devices; as previously noted, the facts in that case are inapposite to those in Plains as the
board in Toys "R" Us engaged in an extensive market check prior to negotiating with the
final bidder. 17 1 The 3Com court next cited to State of Wisconsin Investment Board v.
Bartlett for the proposition that deal protection devices are reasonable "absent director
interest or other breaches of fiduciary duty." 172 In that case, however, the target engaged
an investment banker to solicit offers and "aggressively sought out suitors" who might
benefit from an acquisition prior to entering into an agreement. 173
In support of the notion that no-shop provisions are standard, the 3Com court cited to
In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, another case in which the
defendant board of directors engaged in a public market canvas prior to entering into a
transaction. 174 As for the termination fee, the court in 3Com found authority in Golden
Cycle LLC v. Allan. 175 Impressively, in Golden Cycle the board of directors engaged in a
164. Id.
165. Plains, 2013 WL 1909124, at *6 (quoting In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holders Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1019
(Del. Ch. 2005)) (internal quotations omitted).
166. Toys"R"Us,877A.2dat987.
167. Plains, 2013 WL 1909124, at *6 (citing In re 3Com S'holders Litig., No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804,
at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009)).
168. See generally 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804.
169. 3Com Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 18 (Dec. 25, 2009).
170. 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *7.
171. Id. at *7 n.37 (quoting In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holders Litig., 877 A.2d at 1017) ("[N]either a
termination fee nor a matching right is per se invalid. Each is a common contractual feature that, when assented
to by a board fulfilling its fundamental duties of loyalty and care for the proper purpose of securing a high value
bid for the stockholders, has legal legitimacy.").
172. Id. (citing State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, No. 17727, 2000 WL 238026, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2000)).
173. Bartlett, 2000 WL 238026, at *5.
174. 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 n.37 (citing In re 1XC Commc'n Inc. S'holders Litig.,
No. 17334, 1999 WL 1009174, at *2, 6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999)).
175. Id. (citing Golden Cycle LLC v. Allan, No. 16301, 1998 WL 892631, at *17 (Del. Ch. Dec.10, 1998)).
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seven-month search for an acquirer, engaging 79 companies before entering into a merger
agreement with the final bidder. 176 Finally, the last case to which the 3Com court looked
in support of its conclusion that the deal protection devices at issue there were reasonable
was In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Inc., Shareholders Litigation.177 The Plains court's indirect
reliance on J.P. Stevens again overlooked a stark contrast in facts, as the board in J.P.
Stevens had engaged in a full auction prior to the contested agreement. 1
78
Ultimately, the Plains court relied on several decisions, either directly or indirectly,
to support its conclusion that these deal protection devices are standard, common, and
reasonable. Remarkably, however, the cases upon which it relied address negotiations that
are strikingly dissimilar to the single-bidder strategy at hand in Plains. This is of particular
importance as it reflects an inconsistency between the purported importance of information
gathering alluded to by the courts and what the courts are willing to uphold in practice.
Under the Golden Ratio theory, the greater the information costs incurred, the more
restrictive the deal protection devices should be. The target companies in Toys "R" Us,
JXC, Golden Cycle, and J.P. Stevens likely all incurred greater information costs by
engaging in much more significant pre-signing sale processes. Their "reward," however,
was ultimately the same as that in Plains. As Professor Davidoff Solomon and I argued in
Lock-Up Creep, the overall result is a weakening of the enhanced scrutiny standard as
applied to deal protection devices. 179
B. In re Pennaco Energy, Inc.
Like the court in Plains, the Delaware Court of Chancery considered the balance
between a board's selling/information gathering efforts and deal protection devices in In
re Pennaco Energy, Inc.180 Just like the Plains court, the Pennaco court erred in its
evaluation of the deal protection devices. In Pennaco, Pennaco shareholders sought to
enjoin the anticipated tender offer by Marathon Oil (Marathon) for all of the shares of
Pennaco Energy, Inc. for $19 per share. 18 1 The shareholder plaintiffs argued that Pennaco's
board of directors' method for selling the company was flawed because it did not actively
shop the company and relied solely on a post-market check. 182 Although the Pennaco board
willingly provided information to potential bidders prior to its negotiations with Marathon,
the company did not actively pursue any other bidders, did not obtain a financial advisor
to discuss strategic alternatives, and included a no-shop provision and termination fee of
three percent. 183 Notably, the time between the disclosure of the intended transaction,
December 22, 2000, and the beginning of the tender offer period, January 8, 2001, was
176. Allan, 1998WL892631,at*17n.16.
177. 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 n.37 (citing In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., S'holders
Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 783 (Del. Ch. 1988) for the proposition that deal protection devices are "reasonably
conventional").
178. Id. (citing In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d at 773-76 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
179. Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 18.
180. In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691 (Del. Ch. 2001).
181. Id. at 692.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 704. The board did entertain sales pitches by two financial advisors wherein it received insight
into the advantages and disadvantages of a single-bidder strategy, but it did not hire Lehman Brothers until after
it was seeking a fairness opinion for Marathon's final offer. Id.
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brief.184
Then-Vice Chancellor Strine refused to enjoin the tender offer, holding that the
board's actions were reasonable. 185 Despite the fact that the board only negotiated with a
single bidder, he reasoned, "it bargained hard and made sure that the transaction was
subject to a post-agreement market check unobstructed by onerous deal protection
measures that would impede a topping bid."186 Strine emphasized that the standard a board
of directors is held to by the court should not be perfection but instead reasonableness,
stating that the board of directors is "best equipped" to make judgments as to the complex
business considerations involved in a sale of corporate control. 187 He acknowledged that
"one would not commend the Pennaco board's actions as a business school model of value
maximization" but nonetheless found that the strategy was not unreasonable. 188
The court's decision focused on the experience of the board and the "bullish" nature
with which the company communicated with interested parties. 189 Strine also pointed out
that Pennaco had previously conducted an extensive search for a joint venture partner in
1998, bringing attention to itself before 20 to 30 companies. 190 Strine was not bothered by
the board's failure to hire a financial adviser regarding strategic alternatives, and was
content with the fact that the board heard sales pitches from two financial advisers before
agreeing to the acquisition by Marathon. 191 Strine refused to find fault in the fact that
despite both companies' advice that Pennaco should obtain an updated reserve report to
maximize its value, the board ignored this advice. 192 To find this kind of conduct
unreasonable "would involve second-guessing of the kind Q VC proscribes." 193
Importantly, Strine did note that the actions of the board would likely have been
unreasonable had it locked up the transaction from post-agreement competition with
onerous deal protection devices. 194 His analysis as to this redeeming feature of the deal
was as follows:
But it appears that the Pennaco board was careful to balance its single buyer
negotiation strategy by ensuring that an effective post-agreement market check
would occur. The merger agreement's provisions leave Marathon exposed to
competition from rival bidders, with only the modest and reasonable advantages
of a [three percent] termination fee and matching rights. The plaintiffs' attack on
the termination fee's level is make-weight and at odds with precedent upholding
the validity of fees at this level. 195
The precedent to which Strine refers is three cases arguably inapposite to the facts in
Pennaco. He cited McMillan v. Intercargo Corp. (Intercargo II) and Matador Capital
184. Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d at 703.
185. Id. at 693.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 705.
188. Id.
189. Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d at 705-06.
190. Id. at 705.
191. Id. at 706.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d at 707.
195. Id.
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Management Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc. for the proposition that a three percent
termination fee would not deter a rival bidder, but in those cases the board conducted a
market canvas prior to executing the agreement. 196 Similarly, he cited another case,
Goodwin v. Live Entertainment, Inc., for the same proposition, but in Goodwin the board
had distributed a confidential information memorandum to over 50 prospective lenders
seeking a recapitalization partner, many of whom executed confidentiality agreements and
conducted due diligence. 19 7 As a result of this search, one company came forward with an
acquisition proposal, which was consummated within that year. 198 In Pennaco, by contrast,
the only party to execute a confidentiality agreement and conduct due diligence was
Marathon itself 199 Strine also cited Matador for the proposition that the fact that no other
bidders appear after the execution of the agreement evidences that the board obtained the
best price reasonably available. 200
In the end, like the Plains court, the Pennaco court relied on cases where more
extensive searches were conducted in advance of the agreement for the proposition that the
deal protection devices the Pennaco board agreed to were not "onerous." Strine was
ultimately impressed by the board's expertise alone, despite the arguable bias of certain
board members in favor of getting the deal done. 20 1 But as the previous Section describes,
the courts have repeatedly recognized that a board's special knowledge is not a substitute
for actual pre-signing sale process as a means of information gathering. The next Part
describes the role that special knowledge should play in the Golden Ratio of Corporate
Deal-Making.
V. THE GOLDEN RATIO OF CORPORATE DEAL-MAKING
.4. What is the Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making?
The Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making grows out of auction theory and
information costs incurred in determining the target's value. Under this theory, as the
parties incur more information costs, they essentially "buy" the right to more restrictive
deal protection devices. To the contrary, the lesser the information costs incurred by the
parties, the less restrictive the deal protection devices would be. Information gathering and
distribution occurs most significantly during the pre-signing sale process. Consequently,
as this Section will describe in more detail, the strength of the deal protection devices
should bear a direct relationship to the extensiveness of the pre-signing sale process. 20 2
196. Id. at 707 n.27; McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2000); Matador Capital Mgmt.
Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280 (Del. Ch. 1998).
197. Goodwin v. Live Entm't, Inc., No. 15765, 1999 WL 64265, *2-3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999).
198. Id.
199. Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d at 697-98.
200. Id. at 707.
201. Strine also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the board members were biased. Id. at 708. As an
example of the support for the plaintiff's allegations, several of the board members altered their employment
contracts to substantially increase their severance packages only months prior to negotiating with Marathon. Id.
202. In many ways, the Golden Ratio Theory is a culmination of my scholarship to date, which contends that
certain deal protection devices may be more restrictive in the context of a more extensive pre-signing sale process.
In Auction Theory and Standstills: Dealing with Friends and Foes in a Sale of Corporate Control and Promises
Made to be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, I examined the use of standstill
agreements in public company M&A transactions. Sautter, Auction Theory, supra note 8; Christina M. Sautter,
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As previously described, a fundamental issue for auction theorists is information flow
between the target and potential bidders. The target's provision of information to potential
buyers is not without costs. As auction theorists debate, target boards must weigh these
information costs in deciding what type of sale process to engage in which will best satisfy
their Revlon duties. More precisely, boards must decide which process provides them with
sufficient information to determine that maximum shareholder value has been obtained.
Auction theorists agree that competition results in more significant gains for target
shareholders. Accordingly, a significant consideration for boards is the number of bidders
participating in the sale process. Generally, as competition increases, targets can be more
certain that maximum stockholder value has been achieved. Conversely, as competition
decreases, so does certainty. Because of this lack of certainty, target boards must have some
way to avail themselves of information. This is where the less restrictive deal protection
devices under the Golden Ratio theory should come into play.
The Golden Ratio should be considered on a continuum. More precisely, the more
significant the pre-signing sale process is, the more tolerant courts should be of stronger or
more restrictive deal protection devices. 20 3 Conversely, the less extensive the pre-signing
sale process the less tolerant courts should be of restrictive deal protection devices. When
considering the extensiveness of the pre-signing sale process, the main inquiry should be
the number of potential buyers invited to participate in the process. For example, if a target
only negotiates with a single bidder the deal protection devices in the resulting transaction
should be much less restrictive than deal protection devices included in an agreement
entered into with the winner of a full-blown auction. However, there is not a magic number
of bidders that must be involved in any given sale process. Instead, this inquiry is and
should be context specific, considering the individual characteristics of the target company
and the industry in which the target operates.
Similarly, considering the extensiveness of the pre-signing sale process does not mean
that there is not room for the board's special knowledge about the company and the industry
in which the company operates. As demonstrated in Pennaco as well as many of the
transactions described in Appendices A and B, the Delaware courts consider the board's
special knowledge in evaluating the sale process. This special knowledge can come from
Promises Made to be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 929
(2013). In those articles, I argued that more restrictive standstills, including DADW standstills, could be used
following an extensive pre-signing sale process. See Sautter, Auction Theory, supra note 8, at 568 (providing a
framework for the use of DADW standstills); Sautter, Promises Made to be Broken?, at 983-84 (arguing that, in
considering the validity of standstills, the Delaware courts are likely to focus on the amount of pre-signing
"shopping" in which the target has engaged). Similarly, in Rethinking Contractual Limits on Fiduciary Duties, I
examined merger agreement recommendation fiduciary out provisions. Christina M. Sautter, Rethinking
Contractual Limits on Fiduciary Duties, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 55 (2010). There I argued that an informed board
who "has fully shopped the target company ... should have the right to limit its change of recommendation to
certain defined circumstances." Id. at 98. Finally and most recently, in Fleecing the Family Jewels, I argue that
practitioners should not necessarily shy away from crown jewel lock-up options as they have done in the past.
Christina M. Sautter, Fleecing the Family Jewels, 90 TUL. L. REV. 545 (2016). Instead, consistent with
jurisprudence like Revlon, dealmakers can legitimately use lock-ups in the context of a more extensive sale
process as a way of enticing bidders to enter the sale process, to bid more during the process, and to reward a
winning bidder for their information costs. Id. at 587-88.
203. This argument is also consistent with recent scholarship. Professor Jay Kesten argued, quite
persuasively, in Adjudicating Corporate Auctions, that more restrictive deal protection devices, like DADW
standstills, should be allowed in auctions. Kesten, supra note 20, at 259-4.
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various sources and vary depending upon the particular target's circumstances but can
include recent previous unsuccessful sale processes, valuations by financial advisors,
industry conditions, and the target's particular financial condition. Under the Golden Ratio,
the board's knowledge would continue to play a significant role in 'the level of deal
protection devices the parties could agree to and that the courts should be tolerant of. The
continuum of the Golden Ratio could be boiled down and reduced simply to the following
three "equations" describing the pre-signing sale process and the level of deal protection
that the courts should tolerate under Unocal:
Full blown auction + special knowledge = strongest, most restrictive deal protection devices
Market Canvass + special knowledge = intermediate deal protection devices
Single bidder + special knowledge = weakest, least restrictive deal protection devices
Another way to think of the interplay between the pre-signing sale process (including
the board's special knowledge) and the deal protection devices is to consider the
relationship of trust between the board and shareholders. More specifically, the pre-signing
sale process and the board's special knowledge provide a proxy for the shareholders' trust
of the board. Possible conflicts of interest are inherent in a board's actions and can become
particularly problematic in the context of a sale of control. Although the possibility of
conflicts are never erased, the more extensive the pre-signing sale process, the more likely
the board is not acting out of its own self-interests. It follows that if the board agrees to
more extensive deal protection devices, it is doing so not to favor one bidder over another
for selfish reasons but rather because it is using the deal protection devices as a way of
stimulating the bidding process and/or rewarding the ultimate buyer. On the flip side, if a
target has only engaged in negotiations with a single bidder, shareholders may look with
more suspicion upon the board's actions, particularly if the board agrees to more restrictive
deal protection devices.
Although under the Golden Ratio, the strongest, most restrictive deal protection
devices would follow a full-blown auction, this Article is not contending that a full-blown
auction precede every change of control transaction. To the contrary there may be
situations where a full-blown auction is not prudent or even possible. For example, only a
small number of potential buyers may be willing and able to buy a multibillion-dollar
company. 20 4 In these instances when measuring the extensiveness of the sale process the
focus should be on contacting and engaging the viable acquisition partners that do exist.
This Article is not advocating for certain "set" deal protection devices to be used
depending upon the sale process. Instead, this Article advocates that dealmakers make
those particular calls. An illustration may be helpful. The chart located at Appendix A
204. See Boone & Mulherin, How Are Firms Sold?, supra note 87, at 870 (stating that appropriate sale
process in which to engage is dependent on the corporation's size and the industry in which it operates).
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shows that termination fees of between 3-4% of equity value are common, if not standard,
no matter if an auction process was held or if the target simply negotiated with one bidder
prior to entering into a definitive acquisition agreement. Take for example, the Bioclinica
transaction, which involved an auction process including 21 bidders over an eight-month
period and culminated in a transaction with a 3.6% termination fee. This transaction is the
quintessential auction process but includes a termination fee very close to that contained in
single bidder transactions, like Smurfit-Stone described in Appendix A. The Smurfit-Stone
transaction was a result of single bidder negotiations and included a 3.4% termination fee.
Under the Golden Ratio, the Bioclinica termination fee could be higher and other deal
protection devices could be more restrictive, while the Smurfit-Stone termination fee
should be lower and the other deal protection devices less restrictive. To be clear, however,
even after a full-blown auction like that in Bioclinica, the deal protection devices package
should not be so restrictive as to completely lock-up a transaction.
20 5
B. Implications of the Golden Ratio
The Golden Ratio is not only consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions
in both Revlon and Unocal, but also returns the courts to the enhanced scrutiny standard
from which they have strayed. 20 6 The theory seeks a more thorough analysis of the sale
process, considering all elements of the process in determining the impact of the deal
protection devices on the transaction. In considering the sale process, the courts must weigh
the type of process, the number of bidders involved in the process, the target's unique
characteristics, the target's competitors, and the industry in which the target operates. In
addition, unlike in Plains and Pennaco, for example, in upholding deal protection devices
the courts should consider precedent with similar factual backgrounds.
When following this theory, the result would be a more thorough analysis of the sale
process and of the deal protection devices. Although the theory strives for a detailed factual
analysis by the courts, it also provides practitioners with a basic formula to follow in
negotiating future deals. It would give practitioners greater latitude to negotiate much more
restrictive deal protection devices as the pre-signing sale process becomes more extensive.
In other words, the Golden Ratio will help to make more measurable a relationship that has
previously not been conducive to measurement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making uses auction theory and information
costs incurred during the sale process to make measureable the relationship between pre-
signing sale process and deal protection devices. Specifically, the Golden Ratio is a
proportion measuring the restrictiveness of deal protection devices against the pre-signing
sale process conducted by the target board. Under this theory, the more extensive the pre-
signing sale process, the more information that both the selling company, or target, and
buyer have gathered. In particular, the target board (who has a duty to maximize
205. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930-31 (Del. 2003) (holding that
transactions must include effective fiduciary out provisions).
206. See Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 18, at 701-08 (describing how the Delaware courts have not been
applying an enhanced scrutiny standard to deal protection devices).
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stockholder value in change of control transactions) achieves greater certainty regarding
maximum value from engaging in a more extensive pre-signing sale process. Similarly, the
buyer has greater certainty regarding the target's value. At the same time, information costs
incurred on both sides are higher-as the parties expend more to learn about the value of
the company, there is lower likelihood that a third party will overbid. In this case, the deal
protection devices can be more restrictive because of this information certainty.
Conversely, when the target has engaged in only a single bidder negotiation, information
costs are lower, as is certainty that maximum shareholder value has been achieved. In that
case, because of this lack of certainty regarding the achievable maximum value of the
target, deal protection devices should be less restrictive. In other words, the Golden Ratio
of Corporate Deal-Making provides for a direct proportional relationship between the
information gathering process and the resulting deal protection devices. The ultimate
implication of this theory is a return to the application of an enhanced scrutiny standard to
deal protection devices.
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APPENDIX A: DELAWARE SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF CHANCERY RULINGS ON DEAL
PROTECTION DEVICES FROM APRIL 4, 2003 To DECEMBER 31, 2014207
Omnicare, Inc. v.
NCS Healthcare, Inc.,
818 A.2d 914 (Del.
2003)
Auction process
between two
interested
parties,
preceded by a
market canvass
in which over
50 potential
acquirers were
contacted over
the course of
two years.
Shareholder
voting agreement
with two directors
who together
controlled
majority voting
power of the
target, without a
fiduciary out;
force-the-vote
provision; no-shop
provision with a
fiduciary out;
termination fees of
$11 million, which
represented
approximately
3.24% of the deal
value.
2. In re MONY Group Single bidder Termination fee Preliminary
Inc., S'holder Litig., transaction with representing 3.3% injunction
852 A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. no market of equity value motion by
2004). canvass, and 2.4% of plaintiffs
transaction value, granted to
correct
disclosure.
3. In re Toys 'R' Us, Auction sale Three business Preliminary
Inc. S'holder Litig., process, which days matching injunction
877 A.2d 975 (Del. included a rights; termination motion by
Ch. 2005). public fee representing plaintiffs
announcement 3.75% of equity denied.
that the value or 3.25% of
company was enterprise value;
exploring up to $30 million
strategic expense
alternatives, reimbursement
after a naked no
vote.
207. This chart is based on a chart appearing in Lock-Up Creep. See Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 18, at
725-31. That chart focused on Delaware holdings regarding deal protection devices in cases following Omnicare.
See id. It did not include details regarding the sale process. See id.
Motion for
summary
judgment
granted in
favor of
defendants.
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In re Topps Co.
S'holders Litig., 926
A.2d 58 (Del. Ch.
2007).
Single bidder
sale process
was chosen in
favor of an
auction because
the buyer stated
that the bid
would be
withdrawn if
the target
commenced an
auction.
40-day go shop;
four business days
matching
rights; 20 8
termination fee
and expense
reimbursement of
3% of transaction
value during go-
shop and 4.6% of
transaction value
after go-shop.
5. La. Mun. Police Single buyer Five business days Preliminary
Emps. Ret. Sys. v. negotiations for matching rights; injunction
Crawford, 918 A.2d a merger of termination fee of motion by
1172 (Del. Ch. 2007). equals more than 3% of plaintiffs
transaction deal value; force- granted to
without a the-vote provision; correct
market canvass, no-shop provision disclosure.
with a fiduciary
out; information
rights.
6. In re Lear Corp. Single bidder 45-day go-shop; if Preliminary
S'holder Litig., 926 transaction with the acquirer did injunction
A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. a pre-signing not exercise its motion by
2007). market canvass matching right it plaintiffs
and go-shop. was obligated to granted to
vote its block of correct
shares in favor of disclosure.
superior offer;
matching rights:
10 days but if the
superior proposal
was in excess of
$37 per share, the
acquirer had a
single chance to
match, but if
superior proposal
was not in excess
208. TOPPS Company, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.3(b)(ii) (Mar. 6,2007), http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/812076/000095013607001390/0000950136-07-001390.txt.
Preliminary
injunction
motion by
plaintiffs
granted to
correct
disclosure
and release
third party
from
standstill.
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of $37, the
acquirer had three
days to match
successive bids;
termination fee
and expense
reimbursement of
2.79% equity or
1.9% of enterprise
value during go-
shop and 3.52% of
equity value or
2.4% enterprise
value after go-
shop.
7. Lyondell Chem. Co. Single bidder Termination fee Reversed
v. Ryan, 970 A.2d transaction representing Court of
235 (Del. 2009). without a approximately 3% Chancery's
market canvass, of equity value 20 9  denial of
and 2% of defendant's
enterprise value; motion for
three business summary
days2 10 matching judgment.
rights; no-shop
provision with
fiduciary out
8. In re 3Corn S'holders Single bidder Termination fee Motion to
Litig., No. 5067-CC, transaction and expense expedite
2009 WL 5173804 without a reimbursement fee discovery
(Del. Ch. Dec. 18, market canvass, representing over denied.
2009). 4% of equity
value; five
business days211
matching rights;
no-shop provision
9. In re Dollar Thrifty Single bidder Termination fee Preliminary
S'holder Litig., 14 transaction representing 3.5% injunction
A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. without a of deal value (or motion by
2010). market canvass. 3.9% of deal value plaintiffs
when taking into denied.
209. Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co., No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008).
210. Lyondell Chemical Co., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 4.2(b)(ii) (July 17, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data1842635/000084263507000007/lyoexhibit2-1 .htm.
211. 3Corn Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), §5.3(a)(i)(C) (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/738076/000095012309061809/b78042exv2wl.htm.
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account expense
reimbursement);
_______ 
_______________ I____________matching rights.___
In re Cogent, Inc.
S'holder Litig., 7
A.3d 487 (Del. Ch.
2010).
Auction process
involving five
companies.
Termination fee
representing 3% of
equity value or
6.58% of
enterprise value;
five business days
matching rights;
top-up provision
allowing "3M to
purchase up to
approximately 139
million shares,
consisting of all of
Cogent's treasury
stock and
authorized but
unissued stock, at
the tender offer
price of $10.50 per
share. 3M, at its
discretion could
pay for any stock
purchased under
this provision
either in cash or
with a promissory
note due in one
year."
Preliminary
injunction
motion by
plaintiffs
denied.
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In re Del Monte
Foods Co. S'holders
Litig., 25 A.3d 813
(Del. Ch. 2011).
Single bidder
transaction,
following a
failed limited
auction process
amongst
bidders selected
by the
company's
financial
advisor.
First match: three
business days;
subsequent
matches: two
business days; 45-
day go-shop; if
transacting with
enumerated
"Excluded Party,"
termination fee
"representing
1.13 % of total deal
value and 1.5% of
equity value" but
if transacting with
non-Excluded
Party, termination
fee "representing
2.26% of total deal
value, and 3% of
the total equity
value."
Preliminary
injunction
motion by
plaintiffs
granted to
delay
stockholder
vote 20 days
in an attempt
to obtain a
third party
overbid. The
Vice
Chancellor
found that the
board likely
breached its
fiduciary
duties as it
was misled
by a
conflicted
financial
advisor. The
Vice
Chancellor
compared the
delay "to a
disclosure-
based
injunction"
and prevented
the
enforcement
of the deal
protection
devices
during the
delay.
12. In re Atheros Single bidder Preliminary
Commc'ns, Inc., No. transaction with injunction
6124-VCN, 2011 a pre-signing motion by
WL 864928 (Del. Ch. market canvass, plaintiffs
Mar. 4, 2011). granted to
correct
disclosure.
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Five business
days2 12 matching
fights; termination
fee representing
3.3% of "total
value of the
Transaction."
13. In re Answers Corp. Single bidder Three business Preliminary
S'holders Litig., No. transaction with days2 13 matching injunction
6170-VCN, 2011 a market rights; termination motion by
WL 1366780 (Del. canvass, fee and expense plaintiffs
Ch. Apr. 11, 2011). reimbursement of denied.
4.4% of equity
value; force-the-
vote provision;
two voting
agreements
locking up
approximately
27% of the vote.
14. In re Orchid Auction process Four business Preliminary
Cellmark, Inc. involving eight days2 14 matching injunction
S'holders Litig., No. potential rights; termination motion by
6373-VCN, 2011 acquirers. fee of "less than plaintiffs
WL 1938253 (Del. 3% of the deal denied.
Ch. May 12, 2011). price"; top-up
provision; no-shop
provision with
fiduciary out;
poison pill that
applied to all other
bidders except the
board's favored
buyer; standstill
provision.
212. Qualcomm, Inc., T Merger Sub, Inc., and Atheros Commc'n, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form
8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 4.02(b)(iii) (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 140486/000119312511
001634/dex21 .htm.
213. AFCU Holdings, LLC, A-Team Acquisitions Sub, Inc., and Answers Corp., Agreement and Plan of
Merger (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.3(d)(iii) (Feb. 7 2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1283073/
000114036111006460/ex2_l.htm.
214. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, OCM Acquisition Corp, and Orchid Cellmark, Inc., Agreement and Plan
of Merger (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 5.2(c) (Apr. 6 2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1107216
/000119312511090300/dex2 .htm.
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In re Smurfit-Stone
Container Corp.
S'holder Litig., No.
6164-VCP, 2011 WL
2028076 (Del. Ch.
May 20, 2011),
revised (Del. Ch.
May 24, 2011).
In re Micromet, Inc.
S'holders Litig., No.
7197-VCP, 2012 WL
681785 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 29, 2010).
Single bidder
transaction with
no market
canvass.
Single bidder
transaction with
market canvass.
Three calendar
days matching
rights; termination
fee of
approximately
3.4% of equity
value.
Four business days
matching rights;
termination fee of
3.4% of equity
value and 47% of
enterprise value;
top-up provision;
poison pill.
17. In re OPENLANE, Single bidder Termination fee if Preliminary
Inc. S'holders Litig., transaction with majority of injunction
No. 6849-VCN, 2011 limited market OPENLANE motion by
WL 4599662 (Del. canvass, shareholders did plaintiffs
Ch. Sept. 30, 2011). not consent to denied.
Agreement within
24 hours: 0%.
Also, if the
agreement was
validly terminated:
0%.215
215. OPENLANE, INC., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Sch. 14A), § 8.3 (Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1438302/000114420411050194/v233512_preml4a.htm.
Preliminary
injunction
motion by
plaintiffs
denied.
Preliminary
injunction
motion by
plaintiffs
denied.
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In re Synthes, Inc.
S'holder Litig., 50
A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch.
2012).
Auction process
involving 15
potential
acquirers.
Force-the-vote
provision;
matching rights of
five business days
for a superior
proposal and two
business days for
an amended
superior proposal;
termination fee
representing
"approximately
3.05% of the
equity value of the
[m]erger" or 2.9%
of enterprise
value; voting
agreement locking
up 37% of the
stock which would
be reduced to 33%
of the stock upon a
change in the
board's merger
recommendation.
19. In re Novell, Inc. Auction process Five business days Motion to
S'holder Litig., No. involving over matching rights; dismiss by
6032-VCN, 2013 WL 50 potential termination fee of defendants
322560 (Del. Ch. Jan. acquirers. 2.7% of equity granted.
3, 2013). value; no-
solicitation
provision.
20. In re BJ's Wholesale Auction process "[T]ermination fee Motion to
Club, Inc. S'holder involving representing 3.1% dismiss by
Litig., No. 6623- private equity of the deal value"; defendants
VCN, 2013 WL firms and force-the-vote granted.
396202 (Del. Ch. Jan. strategic provision;
31, 2013). competitors. matching rights of
three calendar
days for superior
proposal and one
calendar day for
superior proposal
revisions. 2 16
216. Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among Plains Exploration & Production Company, Freeport-
Motion to
dismiss by
defendants
granted.
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In re Plains
Exploration &
Prodaction Co.
S'holder Litig., No.
8090-VCN, 2013 WL
1909124 (Del. Ch.
May 9, 2013).
Koehler v. NetSpend
Holdings Inc., Civil
Action No. 8373-
VCG, 2013 WL
2181518 (Del. Ch.
May 21, 2013).
Single bidder
transaction with
no market
check.
Single bidder
transaction,
without a
market check.
"[T]hree percent
termination fee,"
matching rights of
four business days
and two business
days for revised
offers.
2 1 7
Termination fee
"representing
3.9% of the deal
value"; no-shop
provision;
matching rights of
five business days
and three business
days for revised
offers2 18; don't
ask, don't waive
standstills (which
were withdrawn
after oral
argument in the
case), and "voting
agreements...
lock[ing] up
approximately
40% of the
stock... [that]
only terminate if
the Board
terminates the...
Merger
Agreement."
23. Miramar Firefighters Single bidder Termination fee of Motion to
Pension Fund v. sale process $45 million, dismiss by
AboveNet, Inc., No. with market representing defendants
7376-VCN, 2013 WL canvass, approximately 2% granted.
McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. and IMONC LLC (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.1(b)(iii) (June 29, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1037461/000119312511176822/dex2 I.htm.
217. Plains Expl. & Prod. Co., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 5.4(d) (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/891456/000119312512493974/d449913dex21 .htm.
218. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.3(d) (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1496623/000110465913011811/al 3-5550_1 ex2dl.htm.
Motion for a
preliminary
injunction
denied.
Motion for
preliminary
injunction
denied.
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4033905 (Del. Ch. of the deal's
July 31, 2013). equity value; 30
day go-shop which
could be extended
15 days; no
solicitation clause
which became
operative after the
go-shop period.
24. In re BioClinica, Inc. Auction process Termination fee Motion to
S'holder Litig., No. involving 21 representing dismiss by
8272-VCG, 2013 WL strategic and approximately defendants
5631233 (Del. Ch. private equity 3.6% of equity granted.
Oct. 16, 2013). buyers over an value;2 19 matching
8-month period. rights of four
business days for
superior offers
which could be
extended by two
business days for
superior offer
revisions; 220 no-
shop clause;
adopted a poison
pill that exempted
the favored bidder;
top-up option.
25. Chen v. Howard- Auction process No-shop clause Motion for
Anderson, 87 A.3d with seven with a fiduciary summary
648 (Del. Ch. 2014). potential out; four-day judgments by
acquirers. matching rights; defendants
termination fee of granted in
$5.2 million part and
representing 3% of denied in
the equity value. part.
26. Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Single bidder Termination fee Motion to
Corp., Civil Action transaction with representing 4.5% dismiss by
No. 7950-VCP, 2014 market canvass of the deal's defendants
WL 2931180 (Del. involving 25 equity value; no- granted.
Ch. June 30, 2014). potential solicitation
acquirers, agreement with a
219. In re Bioclinica, Inc. S'holder Litig., BioClinica Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for
Expedited Proceedings, No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 663191 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2013).
220. BioClinica, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.3(c)(iii) (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/822418/000104746913000537/a2212643zex-2_l.htm.
[Vol. 41:4
The Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making
fiduciary out;
change in
recommendation
provision;
information rights;
standstill
provision;
matching rights
for three days.
In re Comverge, Inc.,
Civil Action No. CV
7368-VCP, 2014 WL
6686570 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 25, 2014).
Single bidder
transaction with
market canvass
involving 25
potential
acquirers for a
minority
position in the
company.
Go-shop period
which could be
extended 10 days
if the target
company was
negotiating a
potentially
superior proposal;
termination fee of
$1.206 million
during the go-shop
period, and $1.93
million after the
go-shop period
expired; expense
reimbursement for
up to $1.5 million;
top-up option.
Motion to
dismiss by
defendants
granted.
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL FACTS REGARDING THE SALE PROCESSES FOR THE CASES
INCLUDED IN APPENDIX A
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003):
Of the 50 companies contacted, only two expressed interest--Omnicare and Genesis.
Id. at 920. Omnicare was interested in acquiring the target company via an asset sale in
bankruptcy that offered little recovery for the target company's noteholders, and no
recovery for the target's stockholders. Id. at 921. Genesis proposed a transaction that did
not involve bankruptcy that would fully repay the target's noteholders and also provide
some recovery for its stockholders. Id. at 922-23. Believing the Genesis offer to be
superior, the board entered into an exclusivity agreement with Genesis for 30 days. Id. at
923. During the exclusivity period, Omnicare made a higher offer than what Genesis
offered, but subject to Omnicare being satisfied after conducting due diligence. Omnicare,
818 A.2d at 924. The board used the Omnicare offer to extract a higher price, and
eventually agreed to a merger with Genesis. Id. at 924-25.
Orman v. Cullman, No. 18039,2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. 2004):
The board formed a Special Committee to negotiate with the bidder, but did not
authorize the Special Committee to solicit offers from third parties. Id. at *2. During the
negotiations, the buyer required the target company's controlling shareholders to enter into
a voting agreement. Id. In order to extract a higher offer, the shareholder agreed to a longer
voting agreement. Id. at *3. The board received a fairness opinion indicating that $15.25
per share should be paid to the public shareholders-which was a significant premium
above the market value. Id.
In re MONY Group Inc. S'holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004):
Over the course of nine months, the buyer made bids that declined in value because
of change-in-control agreements (CICs) between the target company and its senior
management. Id. at 15-18. After modifying the CICs, the target company was able to
negotiate a higher price that represented a 7.4% market premium. Id. at 17. The merger
agreement contained a window-shop provision and a fiduciary out. Id. at 18. After the
agreement was publicly announced, one company indicated an interest in acquiring the
target, but never submitted an offer. Id.
In re Toys 'R' Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005):
Based on input from its financial advisors, the target company conducted a market
canvass for selling off divisions of the company, rather than selling the company as a
whole. Id. at 982-84. In the final round of bidding on one of those divisions, one of the
bidders expressed an interest in buying the entire company. Id. at 987-90. The target
company then solicited bids for the entire company. Id. at 990. Instead of soliciting bids
from all bidders, the target company chose to solicit only those bidders that were in the
final round of bidding for one of its divisions. Id. Of the bids that were submitted, the board
chose a bid that was $1.50 higher than the next-highest bid. Toys 'R' Us, 877 A.2d at 994-
95.
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In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007):
After negotiating for a higher price, and a go-shop period, the target company entered
into a definitive agreement at a price its financial advisor deemed fair. Id. at 65. During the
go-shop period, the target's financial advisor contacted 107 potential bidders, five of which
expressed interest. Id. Only one potential bidder pursued an acquisition. Id. at 71.
La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172 (Del. Ch. 2007).
After entering into a merger agreement with one company, a competing bidder
emerged and made an unsolicited bid for the target company. Id. at 1182-83. The board
determined that the offer did not constitute a superior proposal. Id. Nevertheless, the
original buyer increased the offering price. Id. at 1183. After the original buyer increased
the bid price, the competing bidder commenced an exchange offer. Id.
In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 2007):
The target company formed a Special Committee to evaluate strategic alternatives,
which received a bid from Carl Icahn. Id. at 99. The Committee rejected the initial offers,
and tried to extract more value, but Icahn identified $36 per share as his highest and final
offer. Id. at 103-04. Fearing that an auction process would lose the Icahn bid as well as
disrupting the company's customer relationships, the Special Committee opted for an
abbreviated pre-signing market canvass, and a go-shop provision. Id. at 104. During the
pre-signing market canvass, which lasted only three days, the target solicited eight
companies, but none submitted an offer. Id. Later, during the go-shop period, 41 potential
buyers were contacted, but only 8 entered into confidentiality agreements. Lear Corp., 926
A.2d at 106. None of those buyers submitted a bid. Id.
Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009):
Over a four-month period the board obtained a price increase of nearly $20 per share
over the original offer. Id. at 237-39. The board sought, but ultimately did not obtain, a go
shop provision, but the board was successful in negotiating for a reduced termination fee.
1d. at 238-39.
In re 3Com S'holders Litig., No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18,
2009):
After terminating a prior merger agreement with an unrelated company, the target
company continued to explore strategic alternatives. 3Com Corp., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Form 14A), at 18 (Dec. 25, 2009). Recognizing a downturn in business and the
target's industry, the target board opted to explore a "commercial relationship" with several
companies, but only HP was willing to share confidential information. Id. at 18-19, 23.
After learning about the target's business, HP made an indication of interest in acquiring
the target rather than engaging in a commercial relationship. Id. at 19. After the board
rejected HP's initial offer, news leaked that HP was interested in acquiring one of the
target's competitors. Id. at 20-21. Although there were public rumors that the target
company was in play, no other companies approached the target to discuss an acquisition.
Id. at 23. The target board considered a market canvass, but because of the lack of interest
from other companies as well as the fear of HP acquiring a competitor instead of the target,
the target agreed to negotiate exclusively with HP. 3ComCorp., Definitive Proxy Statement
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at 23 (Dec. 25, 2009). The two companies continued negotiations and the target continued
to reject proposals until arriving at $7.90 per share, which was nearly $3.00 higher than the
initial indication of interest. Id. at 19, 25.
In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010):
The transaction was with a buyer that the company had prior dealings. Id. at 579-81.
After unsuccessful acquisition proposals in the years before, the target was approached
with a new acquisition proposal. Id. at 581. The board considered the proposal, and
negotiated for a higher price. Id. at 584-85. Believing that an alternative buyer would not
be in the financial position to submit a bid, and also that an auction would cause the buyer
to withdraw, the board agreed to a merger. Id. at 585-87. The buyer agreed to divest certain
assets should there be anti-trust concerns, as well as a reverse termination fee if anti-trust
approval could not be obtained. Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 585. After entering into the
merger agreement, the alternative buyer jumped the transaction. Id. at 589-90. The offer
would give the shareholders greater value, but did not have the same closing certainty-
namely the second bidder did not agree to divest assets, nor did it agree to a reverse
termination fee. Id. at 592. The target company's board determined that the overbid would
not close on a timely basis, and declined to accept the proposal, and resumed the merger
with the first buyer. Id.
In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487 (Del. Ch. 2010):
The target company had explored strategic alternatives for two years, reaching out to
27 potential bidders, five of which entered into non-disclosure agreements. Id. at 493. After
a lengthy process negotiating with each potential bidder, the board opted for an offer that
presented the fewest closing contingencies. Id. at 495-96. The merger agreement called for
the buyer to make a tender offer for all shares of the target's stock, followed by a short-
form merger at the same price. Id.
In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011):
Responding to an unsolicited offer, the target company engaged a financial advisor as
part of a limited, private auction process. Id. at 819-21. The financial advisor solicited
interest from private equity firms, in an effort to provide buy-side financing. Id. at 819-20.
Six private equity firms emerged, each agreeing to a confidentiality provision, two year
standstill provision, and a "no teaming provision" which ensured that the target company
would control which companies would be allowed to work together on a joint bid. Id. at
820-22. However, based on the strength of its stand-alone prospects, the company decided
to shut down the process. Id. at 822. Seven months later, the company's financial advisor
surreptitiously encouraged private equity groups to partner together for a proposal. Del
Monte Foods Co., 25 A.3d at 823. The board then negotiated a higher price, but decided
not to do a pre-signing market check because of the prior auction process. Id. at 824-25.
The board agreed to allow the private equity firms to submit a joint bid, as well as to allow
the financial advisor to do the buy-side financing. Id. at 826-27.
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In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc., No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 864928 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4,
2011):
After receiving an offer from a long-time business partner, the company considered
the universe of potential acquirers. Id. at * 1-4. The board determined that the initial bidder
and three other companies would be able to pay the highest price. Id. at *4-5. The other
companies displayed varying degrees of interest, but none immediately made offers. ld. at
*3-4. After rejecting the initial offer, the board approved an exclusivity agreement with
the initial buyer in exchange for a higher price. Id. at *4-5.
In re Answers Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 6170-VCN, 2011 WL 1366780 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 11, 2011):
The target company rejected several offers from a single bidder in the range of $7.50-
$8.25 per share and rejected demands for exclusivity. Id. at *1-2. The target company
conducted a market check in which ten companies were solicited, three of which entered
into confidentiality agreements, but none made an offer. Id. at *2. The board then sought
another price increase from the bidder and obtained a fairness opinion that $10.50 per share
was in the best interests of the shareholders. Id.
In re Orchid Cellmark, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 6373-VCN, 2011 WL 1938253 (Del.
Ch. May 12, 2011):
Over the course of two years, the target company rebuffed several offers from a single
bidder and then conducted a market check. Id. at * 1-3. Seven other potential bidders came
forward, but none were interested in a transaction for all of the target's business. Id. at *5.
Private equity firms appeared interested in acquiring a division of the target's business, but
none made an offer. Id. The target then granted the previously unsuccessful bidder an
exclusivity period, during which the target company agreed to a merger agreement at a
price representing a 40% premium over the target's trading price. Id. at * 1-4. The board
negotiated through a special committee, and five of six board members were independent.
Orchid Cellmark, 2011 WL 1938253, at *1-4.
In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL
2028076 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011), revised (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011):
The target company had engaged in serious negotiations with a private equity firm.
Id. at *3. Ultimately, however, the offer was turned down because the company believed
the offer of $29 per share was inadequate. Id. at *5. Then, the target entered bankruptcy.
Id. After emerging from bankruptcy, the target company entered into a merger agreement
with a bidder. Id. at *5-7. The target did not reengage with the private equity firm because
it believed that the private equity firm would not be able to match the prices offered by the
new buyer. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 at *8. The
target's board approved the deal worth $35 per share, after having rejected two prior offers
at lower prices. Id.
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In re Micromet, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 7197-VCP, 2012 WL 681785 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 29, 2012):
Over several months, the target's board rejected several offers made by the Target's
drug development partner. Id. at *1-2. The target authorized its financial advisor to reach
out to seven strategic acquirers that had previously conducted due diligence in the
partnering process. Id. at *4. Of the seven companies solicited, only three expressed
interest. Id. After conducting due diligence sessions, none of the solicited companies were
interested in acquiring Micromet. Id.
In re OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 30, 2011):
After a downturn in business, the target company retained a financial advisor to
explore strategic alternatives. Id. at *1-2. The financial advisor identified eight potential
strategic acquirers and 31 potential buyers. Id. at *2. Following discussions with three
companies, the target granted an exclusivity period to KAR. Id. Following further
negotiations and counteroffers, the board approved a merger with KAR, without seeking a
fairness opinion from its financial advisor. Id. at *2-3.
In re Synthes, Inc. S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2012):
The target board decided to explore the sale of the company, engaged a financial
advisor, and appointed an independent director to lead the sale process. Id. at 1024-27. Out
of nine strategic buyers contacted by the board, three executed confidentiality agreements.
Id. at 1026-27. Out of six private equity firms the board approached, four executed
confidentiality agreements. Id. at 1027. The private equity firms were allowed to
collaborate to be able to join together as a consortium for an all-cash offer. Id. at 1027.
Eventually, the board was able to extract a price from the strategic bidder that represented
a 26% market premium, which included a mixture of 65% stock (subject to a collar) and
35% cash. Synthes, Inc., 50 A.3d at 1030.
In re Novell, Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6032-VCN, 2013 WL 322560 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3,
2013):
In response to a Schedule 13D publicly announcing an acquisition plan of the target
company, the target board initiated an auction process. Id. at *2. The board solicited over
50 potential acquirers. Id. Of those contacted, more than 30 entered into a non-disclosure
agreement. Id. In the first round of bidding, nine bidders submitted preliminary proposals.
Id. at *2-3. The board pursued further discussions with five of the potential buyers, and
still solicited additional potential buyers. Novell, Inc., 2013 WL 322560 at *2-3. After
considering various proposals for two months, the target's board granted one bidder an
exclusivity agreement, which it later renewed. Id. The board allowed a bidder to work with
strategic partners, which lead to an offer of $5.25 per share, while another bidder that was
not allowed to work with strategic partners submitted a bid for $5.75 per share. Id. at *3-
4. Eventually, the board approved an acquisition and patent sale with the bidder offering
$5.25 per share. Id. at *4.
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In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6623-VCN, 2013 WL 396202
(Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013):
After a potential buyer filed a 13D disclosing its interest in acquiring the target
company, the target engaged a financial advisor and formed a special committee led by
independent directors to evaluate potential alternatives. Id. at *2. Two other bidders
emerged as interested in acquiring the target company, one a strategic competitor and one
a private equity firm. Id. Both of these bidders were turned away by the Special Committee
because Party A had no prior history of acquiring domestic companies, and Party B's offer
required the target to acquire Party B's franchises. Id. at *2-3. Both of these offers were
rejected in favor of a joint acquisition proposal by private equity firms at a price
representing a 6.6% premium, but which was less than the other bidders' offers. Id. at *2-
3.
In re Plains Explor. & Prod. Co. S'holder Litig., No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124
(Del. Ch. May 9, 2013):
The target company bargained for a higher price representing a 39% market premium,
which included a mixture of cash and stock. Id. at *2-3. A fairness opinion indicated that
the price was fair. Id. at *3. The board did not negotiate a collar to account for price
fluctuations in the buyer's stock. Id. at *2. Although one member of the board would have
a role in the new company, the majority of the board was independent. Id. at *3.
Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch.
May 21, 2013):
Prior to entering into the transaction, the target company had been approached by
various private equity firms and strategic acquirers, but the target continually rejected these
indications of interest. Id. at *2. Throughout these discussions, the target company required
those interested companies to enter into confidentiality agreements containing standstill
provisions and "don't ask, don't waive" provisions that prohibited them from making bids
after the sale was announced. Id. at *3-4. Throughout the negotiation process, the target
company portrayed itself as "not for sale" in an attempt to encourage the single bidder to
raise the offering price. Id. at *3-4. The board sought a go-shop provision, but agreed to a
no-shop provision in exchange for a higher offering price and a lower termination fee. Id.
at *6-7.
Miramar Firefighters Pension Fund v. AboveNet, Inc., No. 7376-VCN, 2013 WL
4033905 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2013):
Believing the best course of action was to take the company private, the board began
negotiating with a private equity group, which submitted an offer at $78.00 per share. Id.
at * 1-2. During the market canvass, the target company received a competing bid from a
strategic acquirer at $80 per share. Id. at *2. Eventually, the target board reached a deal
with the strategic acquirer at $84 per share. Id.
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In re BioClinica, Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 5631233 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 16, 2013):
The bidders signed Nondisclosure Agreements that included standstill agreements
precluding most non-consensual offers, but allowed bidders to commence a tender offer.
Id. at *2. When one bidder made its offer contingent on an exclusivity agreement, the board
agreed to an exclusivity agreement because during the six-month process, only two credible
bidders had emerged. Id. The process resulted in a price of $7.25 per share, which included
a 25% premium over the stock price. Id. at *3. Although one member of the board would
have a role in the new company, eight out of nine board directors were independent. Id. at
*2.
Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 (Del. Ch. 2014):
As negotiations with two of the potential buyers were nearing the end, the target
company conducted a twenty-four-hour market check in which seven companies were
contacted, five of which were interested but made no offers. Id. at 659. After the twenty-
four-hour market check, the target company began to exceed business expectations. Id. at
661-63. Nevertheless, the target entered into an exclusivity agreement with a favored
buyer, which later evolved into a definitive agreement without demanding a higher sale
price. Id. at 661-62. During the negotiations process, the target company routinely favored
one bidder over another by not sharing certain financial data, and not being receptive to
that buyer's discussions. Id. at 660-64.
Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., No. 7950-VCP, 2014 WL 2931180 (Del. Ch. June 30,
2014):
In response to an unsolicited offer from a buyer, the board formed an independent
committee to consider alternatives and began a market canvass. Id. at *2. Of 24 potential
purchasers contacted, seven entered into confidentiality agreements. Id. at *3. However,
none of those other 24 potential purchasers made an offer. Id. Over the course of two years,
the board rejected two offers as inadequate and negotiated an increase in the offer price
from $2.88 to $3.10 per share. Id. at *2-3.
In re Comverge, Inc., No. CV 7368-VCP, 2014 WL 6686570 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25,
2014):
After conducting the market canvass over an eighteen-month period, the board
negotiated with a buyer for a sale of the company. Id. at *2. The buyer was interested in
acquiring the target company for a price in the range of $1.75 to $2.25 per share. Id. As
these negotiations were ongoing, another buyer came forward with an indication of interest
in the range of up to $4.00 to $6.00 per share but never made a formal offer. Meanwhile,
the original potential buyer purchased rights in a note the target company owed. The buyer
used the impending default on the note as leverage to continue negotiations that lead to a
two-tier tender offer at $1.75 per share. Id. at *3-4. During the go-shop period, "several"
potential buyers were contacted and executed confidentiality agreements. Id. at *7. Two
bidders indicated interest in acquiring the company at prices ranging from $2.50 to $3.25
per share, but no firm proposals were made. Comverge, 2014 WL 6686570, at *7.
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